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 Innovation is viewed as critical to fostering the growth of markets, generating 
efficiencies, and improving welfare. In this study we examine the determinants and 
the shifting dynamics of innovation in the U.S. automobile market. We use firm-level 
time-series data over a long horizon (1969-2012) for nine well established firms 
selling in the U.S. market (GM, Ford, Chrysler, Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Volkswagen, 
BMW, and Daimler).We examined three aspects related to market competition, 
innovation, and innovation rivalry in the U.S. automobile industry. 
First, we examine the relationship between competition and innovation. We use 
patent counts as a measure of innovation, and use market shares and market 
concentration as measures of market competition. Some of our key findings are: (1) 
increase in firms’ market shares result in higher patenting, and the relationship is 
reasonably non-linear; (2) higher market-wide competition results in an increase in 
patenting, and the relationship is weakly non-linear; (3) there is relatively strong 
path-dependence in firms’ patenting behavior. 
 Second, we examine the relationship between knowledge gap and patent rivalry. 
In particular, we examine how a firm’s current patenting behavior is influenced by the 
knowledge gap between the leader and the firm, firms’ market shares, and the indirect 
effects of knowledge gap and market share. Our key findings are: (1) the relationship 




in market share results in higher current patenting; (3) the interaction between firms’ 
market share and technology gap does not have a statistically significant effect on 
their current patenting.  
 Third, we examine the changing composition of patents. Over time, the dynamics 
in a market can change substantially due to competition in the product market, 
shifting positions of firms from an innovation standpoint, fundamental shifts in 
technology, changes in regulatory constraints, among other factors. We study the 
intertemporal shifts in the composition of innovation, and in particular, we examine 
how a firm’s current patenting behavior is influenced by the own patent concentration 
and rivals patent concentration. Our key findings are: (1) the relationship between 
knowledge stock and current innovation is complex, and depends on technologies 
categories; (2) an increase in own patent diversification results in higher current 
patenting in electrical & electronic and mechanical technologies; (3) an increase in 
rivals’ patent diversification results in higher current patenting in electrical & 
electronic on mechanical technologies; (4) rivals’ knowledge diversification has 
statistically higher effects on current patenting than own knowledge diversification, 








1.1 Industry Description 
 Innovation is viewed as critical to fostering the growth of markets, generating 
efficiencies, and improving welfare. A significant amount of research has been 
studied the determinants of innovation, and as we discuss in chapter 2, theoretical and 
empirical literature provide a wide determinants of innovation. However, those 
studies fail to reach a general conclusion.  
In this study we examine the determinants and the shifting dynamics of 
innovation in the U.S. automobile market, which, over our sample period, has perhaps 
been the most vibrant market with most of the major global producers competing to 
showcase their technological prowess and vying for market competition. Focusing on 
the U.S. automobile market to examine the relationship between competition and 
innovation is meaningful for several reasons. First, the U.S. automobile market is 
economically large. Till the year 2010, the U.S. was the #1 automobile market, before 
China overtook it starting 2011. Further, during the period 2004-2008, for example, 
the motor vehicles industry created about 1.1 million jobs in the U.S. This number is, 
for example, significantly greater than for semiconductors (0.48 million), aerospace 
(0.47 million) and pharmaceuticals (0.29 million). A recent report notes that the 




generates large capital investments.  Second, the U.S. market has seen dramatic 
intertemporal changes in the market shares of the main firms as well as patenting 
profiles. Around 1970, GM and Ford had a combined share of about 65% of the U.S. 
market. By 2010, this sum had been reduced to about 30%. The American firms’ 
dominance was in part due to the home-market advantages, as well as important 
innovations that were introduced by them.  The U.S. firms’ leading positions were 
challenged by the Japanese firms in the aftermath of introduction of U.S. 
environmental regulations in the early-1970s, and the dramatic oil price shocks 
starting in 1973. While Toyota is the largest Japanese firm in the U.S. market by 
market share, Honda and Nissan are well established and offer significant competition 
to their rivals. Volkswagen, BMW, and Daimler are the three major manufacturers 
from Germany. VW competes with the U.S. and Japanese firms in the mass-produced 
segment, but its market share on average has been rather low. BMW and Daimler sell 
cars exclusively in the luxury segment, and are not directly comparable to the U.S. 
firms. However, they compete with Toyota, Honda, and Nissan in the luxury 
segments, as well as GM’s Cadillac lineup to some extent.1 
The automobile industry shows healthy overall patenting, as well as product and 
process innovations. According to a USPTO report, the total patent count of the motor 
                                                 
1 One of the important reasons why we focus on the U.S. market is the availability of complete data on the major 
competitors. For the non-U.S. markets, we were unable to obtain complete data on market shares and other 
attributes over our time period. Overall, the data limitations for the foreign markets were rather severe. We note 
that ours is not the only study focusing on the U.S. market. The papers by Lieberman et al. (1990), Lieberman and 




vehicles and related industry was 8,298. 2   This compares favorably to other 
industries such as medical equipment and supplies (9,716), plastics and rubber 
products (8,289), and is higher than in, for example, aerospace products and parts 
(2,726), and fabricated metal products (5,495). The motor vehicles patent count was 
lower than in industries such as basic chemicals (12,109), and pharmaceuticals 
(13,627). The USPTO report also presents information on the percent of product and 
process innovations for which patents were considered an effective mechanism for 
appropriating the returns to innovation. For the motor vehicles and related industry, 
38.9% of the managers considered patents as an effective protection of product 
innovations and 21.7% for process innovation. For comparison, the respective 
percentages for some other industries were as follows: aerospace (32.9% and 21.4%); 
computers (41% and 30%); machine tools (36% and 18%); and pharmaceuticals (50.2% 
and 36.2%). The motor vehicles percentages were higher than in, for example, 
electronic components (26.7% and 15.2%) and semiconductors (21.3% and 23.3). So 
whether we examine overall patenting rates or product and process innovation aspects, 
the motor vehicles industry appears to be quite vibrant relative to many other 
industries which have high overall rates of innovation and patenting. 
                                                 
2 Economics and Statistics Administration and United States Patent and Trademark Office (2012): “Intellectual 




1.2 Objective of the Research 
 The primary goal of this research is to develop empirical models for analyzing the 
determinants of innovation with various aspects. In summary, this research 
investigates the problems listed below: 
 1. How market competition and rivals’ market shares affect firms’ innovations? 
 2. How does knowledge gap affect firms’ innovations? 
 3. What are the changing composition of patents and why there are those shifting 
dynamics? 
We use patents as an indicator of innovative activity. Patents are awards to firms’ 
research, are visible outcomes of innovative activities, likely to be linked to new 
technologies introduced to the market, and relate to competition in technologies, 
market performance, and other aspects of firms’ strategies. Apart from patents being a 
widely used measure of overall innovative activity, our choice of patents is motivated 
by the fact that we are able to compile a consistent database of patents by the 
automobile firms for the full sample period 1969-2012. Data on R&D expenditures, 
an alternative indicator of innovation, were not available for the majority of the firms 
for most years in our sample period. Lacking consistent data in R&D, we use patent 
counts as an indicator of innovation. 
A salient aspect of our study is that we use firm-level time-series data on 




which enables us to better estimate the dynamic relationships in the market. We use 
dynamic panel data models to estimate the determinants of firms’ innovation. Our 
panel models control for a range of factors related to GM’s bankruptcy, the 
Daimler-Chrysler merger, environmental regulations, voluntary export restraints, 
business cycle conditions, among others. To examine the objectives, we focus on nine 
well established firms selling in the U.S.: GM, Ford, Chrysler, Toyota, Honda, Nissan, 
BMW, Daimler, and Volkswagen. While there are several other smaller firms in the 
market, our choice of nine firms is motivated by two reasons. First, these nine firms 
have, on average, accounted for approximately 91% of the sales in the market over 
our sample period. Second, data for these firms are consistently available over our 
entire sample period. 
1.3 Brief Summary of Each Chapter 
 Chapter 1 gives a brief description of the objectives of this research. 
 Chapter 2 provides the literature review. The theoretical and empirical studies of 
different topics on innovations are described. The studies of determinants of 
innovation show that there are no general conclusions, and the effects of various 
factors on innovation depend on specific structure of the model and parameters, and 
the relationships are complex. 
 Chapter 3 describes relationship between competition and innovation. We 
describe the significant intertemporal fluctuations in firms’ market shares and patents, 




 Chapter 4 discusses the relationship between knowledge gap and innovation. In 
this chapter, we examine that in an oligopolistic market, if a firm has a 
knowledge/technology gap with the leader, whether it will innovate more to catch up 
to close the gap or even surpass the leader, or innovate less and cede ground. We 
examine how a firm’s current patenting behavior is influenced by the knowledge gap 
between the leader and the firm, firms’ market shares, and the indirect effects of 
knowledge gap and market share. 
 Chapter 5 focuses on the changing competition of patents. Over time, the 
dynamics in a market can change substantially due to competition in the product 
market, shifting positions of firms from an innovation standpoint, fundamental shifts 
in technology, changes in regulatory constraints, among other factors. In this chapter, 
we study the intertemporal shifts in the composition of innovation and the 
determinants of these shifting dynamics.  




CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Innovation and Competition 
 The literature examining the linkage between competition and innovation is quite 
extensive and it is not our objective here to present a comprehensive overview. Some 
papers in the literature already do this, such as Cohen and Levin (1989), Ahn (2002) , 
and Gilbert (2006). In this section we review some of the key theoretical results and 
empirical findings to focus on our empirical analysis. 
2.1.1 Theoretical Literature 
 The early foundations of the literature relating competition to innovation were 
provided by Schumpeter (1934, 1942) and Arrow (1962). Schumpeter (1934) argued 
that the prospect of achieving monopoly rent induces a firm to invest in R&D. 
Schumpeter (1942) noted that once a firm achieves a monopoly position through 
innovation, it will have an incentive to incur additional innovation expenditures to 
reinforce this position. A large firm is induced to seek innovation to increase and 
strengthen its market power. Arrow (1962) considered an inventor’s decision in a 
competitive market versus a monopoly, and showed that pre-invention monopoly 
power acted as a disincentive for further innovation. Arrow’s prediction, in contrast to 
Schumpeter, was that firms with low market share – in an atomistic competitive 




 The market we study, automobiles, is best characterized as an oligopoly. While 
the above contributions established the bookends on the linkage between competition 
and innovation, the subsequent literature which used oligopoly models to attempt to 
resolve the contradictory results produced even more dispersion of results. An 
important reason is that the oligopoly models vary significantly in their structure and 
assumptions, such as those related to: mode of competition, Cournot versus Bertrand; 
whether the payoffs from invention are certain or uncertain; whether the input into 
patents – R&D – is best described as only containing fixed costs, or a combination of 
fixed and variable costs; whether the innovation is drastic versus non-drastic 
(incremental); whether innovation game is played as a preemption or precommitment 
game; whether the game being modeled is a one-shot or a two-stage game; whether 
the timing of arrival of the technological opportunities is deterministic or stochastic; 
efficiency of firms’ innovation projects; among others. 
 To illustrate the diversity of results from the oligopoly models, we briefly 
describe a few papers below, and in table A.1 we present a summary of some of the 
theoretical results.  Loury (1979) – assuming Cournot competition, fixed and no 
variable R&D project costs, and uncertain date for project completion – found that as 
the number of firms increases (decrease in firm’s market share), the incentive to 
invest in R&D decreases. Lee and Wilde (1980) modified Loury’s model by assuming 
that innovation investments involve both an up-front fixed cost, as well as variable 
costs over the duration of the project. They showed that an increase in the number of 




Delbono and Denicolo (1991) noted that Lee and Wilde’s results depend on the 
specific structure of the model related to incentives and payoffs – e.g., the innovation 
prize is exogenous and independent of the number of firms, and that no account is 
taken of the possibility that firms can have positive profits before the innovation. 
Delbono and Denicolo relaxed these assumptions and found that an increase in the 
number of firms may result in a decrease in firms’ R&D investments – a result similar 
to Loury.  
 There are several papers that examine patenting strategies when firms face 
complex tradeoffs between expropriability of innovation and the degree of 
competition. Anton and Yao (2004), assuming Cournot competition, examine the 
tradeoff between the efficiency-enhancing aspect of patents and the likelihood of 
imitation. In their model, only a small innovation with an insignificant reduction in 
cost will be patented while a large one with a significant reduction in cost will not be 
patented. However, Mosel (2011), assuming Bertrand competition and a cost of 
applying for patents, generates the opposite result: only large innovations whose 
benefits of patenting outweigh the application costs will be filed for patents. Jansen 
(2011) examines patenting incentives in a model of asymmetric information, and 
focuses on the size of an innovation. He finds that under Cournot (Bertrand) 
competition, a firm will tend to patent large (small) innovations, and the incentive to 
patent grows (decreases) with an increase in the number of rivals. Overall, this 




patenting is heavily dependent on the complex interaction between the likely risk of 
expropriation and the mode of competition. 
 For our empirical analysis, we note two key aspects that emerge from the above 
studies: 
1. The impact of competition on innovation is ambiguous. There is no clear prediction 
about the sign of the relationship. The answer depends on a wide range of factors 
noted above.  
2. The models discussed above examine firms’ total innovation efforts – total R&D 
expenditures, or total patents. The theoretical models in this literature do not consider 
issues related composition of innovation (e.g., does greater competition generate 
more process or product innovation), or quality of innovation (e.g., does more 
competition generate low or high quality innovation). Given this, in our empirical 
study we focus on the effect of competition on the total innovation, as measured by 
the total number of patents generated by firms. 
2.1.2 Empirical Literature 
 Given the wide range of results from the theory models, a significant empirical 
literature developed to shed light on the sign and magnitude of this important 
relationship. The empirical studies on the relationship between competition and 
innovation have produced no conclusive results. In table A.2 we present a compact 
summary of some of the empirical studies, which show considerable diversity in the 




Below we, first, discuss some studies that have examined the relationship between 
industry-or-market wide measures of competition and innovation. Second, we note 
some results relating to firm-specific market shares or performance to innovation. 
 The literature reviews by Cohen and Levin (1989) and Ahn (2002) noted that 
innovation and market concentration appear positively related in the majority of 
studies. However, the review by Gilbert (2006) shows no clear conclusions. Turning 
to specific papers, Acs and Audretsch (1988), Blundell et al. (1995, 1999), and Blind 
et al. (2006), for example, found a negative relationship between concentration and 
innovation. In contrast, Scherer (1965, 1967), Levin & Reiss (1984), Scott (1984), 
and Levin et al. (1985) found little influence of concentration on innovation.  
 The empirical literature provides some evidence that the relationship between 
competition and innovation may be nonlinear. Scherer (1965) found a mildly 
nonlinear relationship between total number of patents and total sales. Blundell et al. 
(1995) also found nonlinearities: e.g., even though for the market as a whole there was 
a negative relationship between concentration and innovation, dominant firms were 
more likely to innovate. Aghion et al. (2001) and Aghion et al. (2005) predict a 
nonlinear, inverted U-shaped, relationship between competition and innovation. 
Using a mix of U.K. 2-digit industry data, and U.S. patents data, Aghion et al. (2005) 
reported evidence to support their model predictions. Hashmi (2013), however, finds 
exactly the opposite relationship. While Aghion et al. (2005) report an overall positive 
relationship between innovation and market competitiveness for the U.K. data, 




the relationship, the results vary considerably across studies. There are other studies 
testing the findings by Aghion et al. (2005), and the main variables and main 
conclusions are listed in table A.3. 
 Turning to firm-specific factors, Blundell et al. (1995, 1999) and Lee et al. (2011), 
for example, found that innovation and market share were positively related. Scherer 
(1965) and Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999) found that innovation and firms’ sales 
were positively related. However, other studies found more intricate relationships: 
e.g., Hashmi and Biesebroeck (2006) find an inverted-U relationship between 
innovation and market share, and Noel and Schankerman (2013) find a dynamic 
intertemporal relationship between sales and innovation. Hu (2010) finds that patents 
increased not due to the expansion of firms’ own sales, but by increase in competing 
imports. 
 The literature has examined several other factors that may affect firms’ patenting. 
For example, the influence of demand and technological opportunities (Cohen and 
Levin, 1989), and the influence of industry characteristics (Kondo, 1998). Focusing 
on issues related to appropriation and strategy, Cohen et al. (2002) suggest that 
Japanese and U.S. firms can be quite different, and Blind et al. (2006) use German 
data to study strategic patenting. 
2.1.3 Some Automobile Market Considerations 
In our review of the literature we noted the wide dispersion in findings relating 




patenting. Several papers have emphasized the considerable inter-firm heterogeneity 
between the U.S. and Japanese automobile firms. For example, Lieberman et al. (1990) 
compared the productivity of six U.S. and Japanese automobile firms. Though the 
Japanese firms as a group showed an overall advantage in labor productivity over the 
U.S. firms, there was evidence of significant inter-firm divergence in productivity. 
Lieberman et al. argued that the primary cause for the disparity in productivity among 
those firms was inter-firm differences in management and strategy. Stressing 
firm-level impacts, Lieberman and Demeester (1999) analyzed the relationship 
between inventory and productivity in the Japanese automotive industry. Though for 
most firms the relationship turned out to be negative, the relationship was influenced 
by inter-firm differences especially for Toyota and Nissan. These two firms showed 
different patterns compared to other firms in the industry. Lieberman and Dhawan 
(2005) examined the differences in efficiency and performance among U.S. and 
Japanese firms, using the Resource-Based-View (RBV) approach. According to RBV, 
firms rely on unique and critical resources to maintain their competitive advantages. 
Lieberman and Dhawan found strong inter-firm variation in different facets of the 
firms’ operations and performance. Finally, Lee et al. (2011, 2010) find important 
differences between U.S. and Japanese firms in patenting and other aspects. While 
these studies do not address the link between competition and innovation, they point 
to important heterogeneity across automobile firms in their underlying characteristics, 





The broad research question is clear: What is the relationship between 
competition and innovation? However, neither the theoretical literature nor the 
empirical findings provide clear answers. The predictions relating market-share or 
market-concentration depend on the degree of concentration and market structure, 
mode of competition – price or quantity, cost structure of innovation projects, nature 
of specific technologies being used, among other factors. In terms of the empirical 
literature, the evidence appears to indicate:  (1) that market share tends to positively 
influence innovation; and (2) the impact of market-wide competition is far from clear.  
 We examine the sign, potential nonlinearities, and quantitative magnitudes in the 
relationship between firms’ market shares and market-wide indicator of 
competitiveness (Herfindahl Index), and the automobile firms’ innovation outputs as 
measured by patents. Our analysis provides evidence on broad, market-wide, effects, 
as well as shed light on heterogeneity of responses across firms. As the U.S. 
automobile market is economically large and shows substantial dynamics in both 
competition and innovation, it serves as an interesting setting to examine the broader 
research question. 
2.2 Knowledge Gap and Patent Rivalry 
 There has been a spirited and long discussion about the incentives of innovations 
and patenting. Other than the basic function of protection, patenting behaviors can be 




motivations are referred as strategic patenting behaviors, or innovation rivalry. 
Generally, firms’ innovation behaviors will be guided by relative technological 
positions compared to rivals. Here we briefly summarize the existing theoretical 
models as well as empirical evidence discussing this phenomenon of innovation 
rivalry.  
2.2.1 Theoretical Literature 
 In the theoretical framework of Doraszelski (2003), knowledge stock and the 
difference in knowledge stock are treated as indicators of relative knowledge 
positions. In this study, knowledge stock can have negative or positive effects on 
current innovation. Doraszelski defined the negative influences of knowledge stock 
on current innovation as “the pure knowledge effect,” arguing that as past knowledge 
stocks increase firms’ current possibilities of winning the innovation race, firms are 
able to reduce their current innovation. He also defined the positive influences of 
knowledge stock on current innovation as “increasing returns of innovation,” arguing 
that because of the positive returns of knowledge, firms have incentive to increase 
their current innovation. The net effect of knowledge stock on innovation strategies is 
complex and is affected by parameters. Doraszelski noted that though initially the 
increasing returns of innovation may motivate firms to increase current innovation, 
the pure knowledge effect will eventually dominate: As knowledge stock increases, 
firms reduce current innovation. To further exam the innovation rivalry among firms, 




knowledge gap. He argued that the effect of knowledge gap on current innovation is 
not clear: Knowledge gap can reduce the motivation of innovation for both leading 
and following firms when the possibility of catching up is small, and has negative 
effects on innovation. Knowledge gap can also increase the motivation of innovation 
for the following firm to catch up, and has positive effects on innovation. As he noted, 
because of the positive returns of innovation, initially the leaders may innovate more 
than the followers. However, because the pure knowledge effect eventually dominates, 
leader will innovate less than the followers. As a result, though the knowledge gap 
between the leader and the follower may initially increase, it will eventually decrease. 
Moreover, Doraszelski noted that knowledge stock has indirect strategic influences 
on firms’ patenting behaviors. When a firm has a sufficiently large knowledge stock, 
if its rivals are expanding knowledge stocks, the firm will increase innovation. 
However, when a firm has an insufficiently large knowledge stock, if its rivals are 
expanding knowledge stocks, the firm will decrease innovation.  
 Different from the study by Doraszelski, Aghion et al. (2001) argued that both 
market competition and knowledge gap affect innovation, and the relationships are 
complex. Given the degree of competition, technology gap can increase, decrease, or 
even non-monotonically affect patenting, and the relationship between technology 
gap and current innovation is not clear. Based on this study, Aghion et al. (2005) 
developed a patenting model by including both market competition and technology 
gap. They noted that, market competition is a primary determinant of innovation by 




indirect determinant of innovation by affecting patenting indirectly via market 
competition. They first predicted a non-linear, inverted U relationship between 
competitions and patenting. Second, they predicted that the inverted U relationship 
can be moderated by technology gap: in industries with low technology gaps, the 
inverted-U is steeper. In other words, technology gap has indirect effects on current 
patenting via market share, and the marginal effects are negative. 
 There are several other papers that examine technological positions as 
determinants of innovation. As noted in Grossman and Shapiro (1987), leaders always 
innovate more than the followers. They argued that when the gap between the leader 
and the follower decreases to some extent, both the leaders and the followers will 
increase innovation. Aghion et al. (2001) defined firms as leaders, followers, and 
neck-and-neck firms, and found that generally, neck-and-neck firms innovate more 
than the leading firms. Reinganum (1982) examined the impacts of innovation rivalry 
and found that the effects are complicated and depend on specific structure of the 
model and parameters: with perfect protection, increasing rivalry will increase 
innovation, while with imperfect protection, increasing rivalry has ambiguous 
influences that it may increase or decrease innovation.  
 Khanna (1995) demonstrated technological positions result in diverse innovation 
strategies. He defined a technological frontier as the most advanced technology of 
each firm, and grouped firms based on close technology levels. Within each group, 
firms compete against each other to obtain technological advantages, and between 




innovation race is dynamic: Leaders may either decelerate innovations when they are 
far ahead of the rivals, or accelerate innovations to make catch-up more difficult. 
While the followers are motivated to innovate more to close the gap with the leader, or 
even surpass the leader. Lerner (1997) strongly emphasized the technological 
positions of firms. He noted that though the leaders are likely to innovate more to 
maintain their leading positions, as long as the knowledge gap between the followers 
and the leaders is not too large, the followers still have chances to surpass the leaders 
by innovating more. As a result, followers that trail the leader will innovate more to 
try to surpass the leader. The “leapfrog” behaviors of followers were also noted in 
Fudenberg et al.(1983) and Aoki (1991).  
 For our empirical analysis, we note three key aspects that emerge from the above 
studies: 1. The impact of technological position is ambiguous. There is no clear 
prediction about the sign of the relationship between technological position and 
current patenting. The answer depends on measurement of technological position and 
other factors noted above. 2. The impact of market competition on innovation is 
inverted-U shaped. 3. Technology gap can affect current innovation indirectly via 
market competition. As noted above, we found innovation strategies vary across 
technological positions, and technology gap is widely used to capture firms’ 
technological positions. As a result, to empirically examine the determinants of patent 
rivalry, having a clear measurement of technology gap would help us to focus on the 




2.2.2 Empirical Literature 
 Given the results from the theory models, the empirical studies on the 
relationship between innovation rivalry and technological positions have produced 
relatively conclusive results. Khanna (1995) noted that though followers may simply 
try to close the gap with the leader, they are likely to leapfrog the leader. As a result, 
the vigorous competition in innovation motivated firms to innovate more, and pushed 
forward the technological frontier in the whole industry. Lerner (1997) found 
evidence that firms that trail the leader innovate more. He calculated firms’ percentile 
ranks in technologies and noted that firms in middle percentages have significantly 
greater chances to innovate more. Their findings are consistent with some of the 
predictions of Doraszelski that followers will innovate more than the leaders.  
 Aside from those two papers that empirically test the technological position as a 
determinant of innovation and specifically define what technological position is, the 
influential paper by Aghion et al. (2005) tested the influences of both market 
competition and technology gap, and had a broad measurement of knowledge gap. 
First, using Lerner index to calculate market competition, they found empirical 
evidence that the relationship between competition and innovation is inverted U 
shaped. Second, they also empirically proved that technology gap can affect 
innovation indirectly via moderating the influences of competition on patenting. They 
calculated technology gap by industry-level average proportional distance to the 




variables with technology gap and using a mix of U.K. 2-digit industry data and U.S. 
patents data, they found evidence that the inverted U relationship between 
competition and innovation is steeper in industries with low technology gap. In other 
words, technology gap indirectly affects patenting via market shares. Third, they also 
found evidence that at any level of competition, patenting is always higher in low 
technology gap industries than patenting in the full sample data. This implies that 
though the marginal effect of technology gap on patenting relies on market 
competition, this effect is always negative, and the relationship between technology 
gap and patenting is negative. The study by Lee et al. (2011) also provides evidence 
that the relationship between innovation and knowledge gap is non-linear. They 
constructed “technology index” as an indicator of knowledge gap, and a smaller value 
of technology index indicates a higher knowledge gap. They found the relationship 
between current innovation and technology index is not linear, and is inverted-U 
shaped. 
 The empirical literature provides some evidence of the influences of own 
knowledge stocks and innovation competition as indicators of knowledge positions. 
The papers by Lieberman (1987), Zucker et al. (2007), and Noel and Schankerman 
(2013) found positive influence of own knowledge stock on innovation, and the 
studies by Jaffe (1986),  Zucker et al. (2007), and Noel and Schankerman (2013) 
show that market innovation has positive influences on firms’ current innovation. 
Noel and Schankerman (2013) confirmed the influences of research taken by rivals. 




competitors have negative effects and reduce firms’ patent counts. Also, a higher 
knowledge concentration, indicated by high level of summed citation shares of few 
firms, will significantly reduce firms’ patent counts. In addition, as noted in the 
review by Hall et al.(2014), the impacts of market innovation vary across countries.  
For example, Cohen et al. (2000) and Cohen et al. (2002) statistically demonstrated 
that U.S. and Japanese firms take different patenting strategies: firms in both 
countries use patents to protect intellectual property and block technological advance 
of rivals, and U.S. firms only use rivals’ patent information to launch own projects, 
while Japanese firms even rely on rivals’ patents to launch or execute own projects. 
Branstetter (2001)confirmed empirically that the sign of market innovation is distinct 
across countries. He explained that patents were affected by spillovers and 
competition in innovation stimulatingly, and patent counts as observed were the 
combined outcomes of these two counteracting influences. In empirical specifications, 
knowledge pools represent spillovers and innovation rivalry stimulatingly, and the 
sign of the net effect depends on which effect dominates. 
2.2.3 Summary 
The broad research question is clear: if a firm has a knowledge/technology gap 
with the leader, does it try to catch up and close the gap or cede ground? However, 
neither the theoretical literature nor the empirical findings provide clear answers. The 
predictions of innovation rivalry depend on the technological positions and market 




appears to indicate: (1) market competition and patenting have a non-linear, inverted 
U relationship; (2) the impact of knowledge gap is far from clear; and (3) knowledge 
gap tends to moderate the relationship between market competition and innovation.  
 We examine the indicators of technological positions and market competition as 
determinants of patent rivalry. In terms of the theoretical literature, technological 
positions are measured by the technological steps between leaders, neck-and-neck 
firms, and followers. Our analysis uses the proportional technological gap in 
knowledge stock between the leader and a specific firm to indicate technological 
positions, which is consistent with the empirical literature. Since we calculate 
technology gap by using knowledge stock, we do not include the knowledge stock as 
an individual independent variable to avoid repetition and potential collinearity. In 
terms of the theoretical model by Aghion et al. (2001), we include a quadratic term of 
technology gap to capture the potential non-monotonic effect of knowledge gap. In 
terms of the theoretical and the empirical literature, market competition is measured 
by firm-level market share, and to test the inverted-U relationship, we include a 
quadratic term of market share.  We do not include a market-wide competition 
variable because we focus on a single industry, and the market-wide competitiveness 
is common for all the nine firms and can be treated as year control variables. By using 
market share, we can measure the performance in sales compared to others and 
capture market competition. In terms of the paper by Aghion et al. (2001) and Aghion 
et al. (2005), the indirect effect of technology gap via market shares is captured by an 




2.3 Changing Composition of Patents 
 Literature on technological trajectories and evolutions suggests having a 
diversified innovation portfolio is essential (e.g., Nelson, 1959; Dosi, 1982; March, 
1991; Leventhal and March, 1993). By keeping a diversified innovation portfolio, 
firms are able to capture more technological opportunities by innovating in different 
technology classes. When lacking a diversified background, firms will not be able to 
generate new innovations effectively for several reasons: first, when firms innovate 
too narrow within existing fields, they fail to capture the potential opportunities in 
related fields; second, when firms only innovate too narrow, they are likely to be 
constrained by previous scope and may occur diseconomies of return in knowledge.   
However, diversity may not always benefit firms, and innovating too wide without 
making use of existing knowledge can harm firms’ innovations (March, 1991; 
Leventhal and March 1993). For example, when searching too wide and failing to 
exploit in depth in existing knowledge, firms would not be an expert in any 
technological field and their innovation efficiency would be harmed. 
A relatively broad literature examines optimal structure of keeping a diversified 
knowledge portfolio and taking advantage existing knowledge. In the literature, 
exploring new technologies and innovating in fields that a firm may not have before 
is defined as “knowledge exploration,” and taking use of existing knowledge and 
developing technologies in previous fields is defined as “knowledge exploitation.” 




firms’ innovation activities as well as economic performance, the balance between 
these two factors is far from clear. 
 For example, as March (1991) noted, by focusing on “the refinement and 
extension of existing competences, technologies, and paradigms,” firms can benefit 
from exploitation. By learning from existing knowledge, firms are able to reduce 
learning cost, and gain new insights through existing innovation. As a result, due to 
the constraints in budget, firms tend to focus on their existing technologies without 
exploring new ones. However, as noted by Cohen and Levinthal (1990), when 
lacking a background in diversified innovation, firms are likely to miss the 
opportunities of new technologies and fail to generate new innovations. Hence, how 
to take advantage in existing technologies while not being constrained is important 
for firms, especially in developing new technologies (Leonard-Barton, 1992; 
Granstrand, 1998; Suzuki and Kodama, 2004).   
The study by Levinthal and March (1993) argued that it is valuable to balance 
knowledge exploration and exploitation. Neither knowledge exploration nor 
knowledge exploitation will always benefit innovation. They introduced 2 learning 
traps: over-exploration as firms are learning too wide and over-exploitation as firms 
are learning too narrow. They found these two traps reduce the effectiveness of 
learning, and it is important to keep the balance between knowledge exploration and 
exploitation. However, they argued that what is the optimal structure between 




In the theoretical models, measures of knowledge exploration and exploitation 
are mixed and can have different interpretations. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) used 
knowledge stock to capture both knowledge exploration and exploitation for several 
reasons. First, knowledge stock is accumulated from previous innovation, represents 
firms familiarity with their existing knowledge, and is an indicator of knowledge 
exploitation. Second, knowledge stock enhances firms learning process by 
path-dependence of knowledge, increases learning efficiently in next periods, and is 
an indicator of knowledge exploitation. Third, knowledge stock helps knowledge 
exploration in new technological fields. As prior knowledge can be related to the 
new knowledge, firms are able to understand new knowledge more effectively, 
evaluate potentially technological opportunities more accurately, and explore new 
knowledge more creatively. Hence, knolwedge stock is an indicator of knowledge 
exploration. Given these considerations, knowledge stock helps to capture both 
knowledge exploration and exploitation. Coehn and Levinthal argued that, , 
knowledge stock and knowledge diversity both contribute to innovations since they 
are controlling for knowledge exploration and exploitation. 
 Empirical findings have mixed measurements in knowledge exploration and 
exploitation and find mixed evidence. Knowledge diversity is widely used as an 
indicator of knowledge exploration and has relatively consistent measurement by 
using the Herfindahl index of concentration in technologies (Hall, 2000). Studies 
find diversity has positive effects on innovation (e.g., Garcia-Vega, 2006; 




the theoretical predictions. The positive effects of knowledge diversity on current 
innovation can be summarized as follows: increase in knowledge diversity helps to 
reduce the risk of R&D, increases the possibilities of taking technological 
opportunities in related innovation fields, and increases the spillover effects from 
rivals.   
 Some empirical studies use knowledge breadth and knowledge depth to measure 
knowledge exploration and exploitation respectively. Lerner (1994) measured patent 
scope by patent breadth and emphasized the economic importance of patent scope 
for firms. He developed a proxy of patent breadth from patent classification by 
counting the number of total classes a patent is assigned to, and found evidence that 
patent breadth can statistically increase firms’ values. However, he argued that the 
influences of patent breadth can be decreased by the uniqueness of firms’ 
technologies. Lerner captured the uniqueness of technologies by taking average of 
the ratios of patents in each subclass, and found evidence that for firms with high 
uniqueness, they face less substitution, and their values are less sensitive to patent 
breadth. His measure of technology uniqueness is close to knowledge diversity 
measurement. 
The study by Nicholls-Nixon and Woo (2003) used the U.S. pharmaceutical 
industry to examine the effects of knowledge breadth on patents. They measured 
knowledge breadth by counting the number of biotechnologies that a firm reported. 
However, in their study, knowledge breadth does not have significant influences on 




knowledge depth and examined the effects of these two factors on innovation in the 
global robotics industry. They measured knowledge depth as the percentage of 
repeated citations used in a specific patent, arguing that making use of previous 
research shows the familiarity of existing technology. They measured knowledge 
breadth as the percentage of new citations used in a specific patent, arguing that 
citing new knowledge shows the tendency of exploring new knowledge. They found 
the relationship between innovation and knowledge depth is inverted-U shaped, 
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have indirect and positive effects on innovation via affecting each other.  
Wu and Shanley (2009) took the measurement of knowledge depth by Katila 
and Ahuja, but defined the variable as exploration. In their study, average number of 
patents in each technology area is referred as knowledge depth, and diversity of 
technologies measured by Herfindahl index of concentration is referred as 
knowledge breadth. They examined the U.S. electromedical device industry and 
affirmed the inverted-U relationship between patenting and exploration and the 
positive effects of both knowledge depth and knowledge breadth on patenting. In 
addition, they noticed that the inverted-U relationship between patenting and 





Quintana-García and Benavides-Velasco (2008) used patent stock as a 
combined measure of knowledge exploration and exploitation. They argued that, 
patent stock represents existing knowledge and firms’ cumulative learning process. 
By controlling patent stock, they were able to control knowledge exploitation in 
prior patents. In addition, patent stock is composed by prior patents from both 
exploratory and exploitative research activities, and controlling patent stock can 
measure prior experience in both knowledge exploration and exploitation. In their 
study, as an indicator of both prior knowledge exploration and exploitation, 
knowledge stock has positive effects on innovation.   
The broad research question is clear: what are the determinants of compositional 
shift in technologies? However, neither the theoretical literature nor the empirical 
findings provide clear answers, and the measurements are mixed. The predictions of 
technological trajectories depend on knowledge exploration and exploitation can 
affect current innovations, among other factors. In terms of the empirical literature, 
the measurement is mixed, and the evidence appears to indicate: (1) the effects of 
knowledge exploration is far from clear; (2) the effect of knowledge exploitation is 
far from clear; and (3) diversity in technology portfolio captures knowledge 
exploration, and has positive effects on innovation; (4) knowledge stock captures 
both knowledge exploration and exploitation, and has positive effects on innovation. 
We examine the indicators of knowledge exploration and exploitation as 
determinants of compositional shift in patenting. First, our analysis uses knowledge 




exploitation, which is consistent with the empirical literature. Second, our analysis 
uses Herfindahl index of diversification in technologies as the indicator of 
knowledge diversification to capture knowledge exploration. Third, literature studies 
the intra-firm knowledge trajectories and evolutions, while do not mention inter-firm 
innovation rivalry. Our analysis uses average Herfindahl index of diversification in 











 This chapter examines the relationship between innovation and competition. 
The degree of competition among firms has been recognized as one of the important 
factors influencing innovation. However, as we discuss in chapter 2.1, neither the 
theoretical nor the empirical literature provide clear evidence on the sign or the 
magnitude of this relationship.  Studying the relationship between the competition 
and innovation is important for several reasons. If innovation generates growth of 
markets and efficiency, then creating institutions and markets that foster innovation 
are vital to increasing welfare. Further, if relatively more competitive markets 
generate greater innovation, then antitrust and regulatory policies, for example, 
would need to be structured and enforced appropriately to facilitate competition.   
In this chapter, we examine the relationship between innovation and 
competition in the U.S. automobile market. We use patents to indicate innovation, 
and use market shares, HHI, and main rivals’ market shares to measure market 
competition.  
3.2 Empirical Specification 
Our objective is empirically examine the role played by firm-specific market 




patents. There is a substantial literature on estimation of dynamic specifications 
related to firms’ decision variables, such as physical capital investments, R&D 
investments, employment, and inventory holdings, among others. Eisner and Strotz 
(1963), Holt et al. (1960), Sargent (1978), Kennan (1979), Hendry et al. (1984), and 
Jorgenson (1986), for example, present expositions of the firms’ optimization theory 
behind these econometric models. 3  Following this literature, we use a 
partial-adjustment framework to structure our empirical specification for patents. 
Partial-adjustment models have been used for examining innovation dynamics: e.g., 
Falk (2006) and Lokshin and Mohnen (2012) for R&D, and Kim et al. (2012) for 
patents. As Hendry et al. (p. 1045) note, partial adjustment models are one of the most 
common empirical specifications used to study dynamics. The partial-adjustment 
model is based on a quadratic cost-minimizing framework where firms, when making 
their optimal adjustments related to the decision variable, aim to minimize 
disequilibrium and adjustment costs. The underlying models are framed in terms of a 
‘representative’ firm, and then applied to data at various levels of aggregation. 
 The disequilibrium costs in these models arise due to lost profits from having the 
relevant decision variable at a sub-optimal level. For example, a delayed adjustment 
to the innovation path can lead to lost revenues and profits. Higher disequilibrium 
costs would, therefore, motivate a firm to adjust the innovation path faster. The 
adjustment costs are incurred when the firm attempts to align the actual quantity of the 
                                                 
3 As the theoretical basis and econometric issues for these models have been widely discussed in these papers and 




decision variable to its optimal level. A firm’s attempt to more quickly alter its 
innovation path will result in higher adjustment costs. For example, rapid adjustment 
of the innovation path would require a faster adjustment of stocks of scientific 
personnel, capacity of research laboratories, reallocation of funds related to R&D, 
processing and filing of patents, among other factors. Higher adjustment costs would, 
therefore, motivate a firm to adjust the innovation path more smoothly and slowly. 
The disequilibrium costs and adjustment costs, therefore, act in opposite directions. 
This implies that the actual speed of adjustment of the innovation path will be a 
weighted-average of the two countervailing forces. 
 Denoting a firm’s patents by PAT, the partial-adjustment model is given by (1).  
1 	 ∗  
In (1), ∗ is the optimal (or equilibrium) value of PAT in period t, and λ is the 
speed-of-adjustment parameter. The actual intertemporal adjustment of patents 
( ) is typically a fraction λ ( 0 1  of the desired 
intertemporal adjustment ∗ . High (low) values of λ imply high 
(low) speed-of-response. As the variables are measured in logarithms, the differences 
in the variables are interpreted as percentage changes and allow us to interpret the 
coefficients in the specifications (below) as elasticities.   
 We rewrite (1) as: 




In (2), ∗ is private information to the firm and not directly observed by the 
external researcher. We model ∗ as: 
3 	 ∗  
where  includes relevant driving variables.  
3.2.1 Own Market Share, HHI, and Patents 
 Our primary specification is a logarithmic-linear dynamic panel data model 
which examines the relationship between firms’ own market shares, market 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), and patenting activity. Returning to (3),  is 
modeled as a function of the firm’s own market share, the HHI, and a set of other 
control variables: 
4 		 Ψ , 
where X is the vector of control variables discussed below. Using (4), (3) and (2), 
our panel data model is:  
5 		  
																																						 . 
In (5),  is the annual total number of patents for firm i,  is the 
firm-specific intercept, 	is the lagged own-market share of the firm,  
is one lag of HHI, X is a vector of other controls (discussed below), and  is a 




Log-linear specifications are common in estimating patent specifications. We do 
not use negative Binomial models as our sample contains large well-established 
multinational firms with continuous and relatively high patenting profiles. Negative 
Binomial models are more appropriate when the sample contains small and startup 
firms with over-dispersion of patent counts (e.g., many zeros combined with large 
jumps in patents). Given the continuous nature of our patents data, we use a log-linear 
specification – which has been used in numerous earlier studies on patenting: e.g., 
Kondo (1999), Kortum and Lerner (1999, 2000), Hall and Ziedonis (2001), Hu (2010), 
and von Graevenitz et al. (2013). 
 We include both firm-level market share and HHI in our estimated specification. 
Previous studies have included a measure of firm-specific market share (or related 
variable) and an industry-wide competition measure: e.g., Blundell et al. (1995, 1999) 
and Scherer (1965). An additional point we note is that in our panel, the correlation 
between firms’ market share and HHI is 0.02 – so there is no obvious collinearity 
issue. This is motivated by several factors. First, including market share allows us to 
examine how the market position of the firm itself affects patenting, and including 
HHI allows us to examine how market-wide competitiveness affects patenting. 
Including both allows us to examine the effect of one, controlling for the other. 
Second, the underlying theory models and the extant empirical literature often 
examine and find different effects of firm-specific market-shares and market-wide 
competitiveness: e.g., Acs and Audretsch (1988), Blundell et al. (1995, 1999), Aghion 




and Schankerman (2013). Third, our data show dramatic reallocation of market shares 
across firms over our sample period, and the ensuing time-path of HHI. If our sample 
had only two firms, it would not be meaningful to include both market share and HHI. 
But with nine firms, and significant intertemporal market share and HHI dynamics, it 
is meaningful to control for both.  
 The vector X includes the following control variables:  
(a) The U.S. environmental and emissions control standards – Clean Air Act – that 
were introduced in the early 1970s with subsequent increases in standards in later 
years affected the patenting behavior of firms due to the need to generate newer 
products and processes to meet the emissions standards (Lee et al., 2010, 2011). They 
found that the environmental effect was most pronounced for the initial introduction 
of standards 1970-1973, with much smaller estimated effects during the 1990-1993 
period, and that the effects were asymmetric across firms. There are important 
differences between the Lee et al. papers and ours. First, our focus is on competition 
and total patents. They study the link between emissions-control related patents and 
the regulatory standards. Second, our sample period is much longer. Nevertheless, we 
follow Lee et al. and control for potential policy-induced effects and create two 
dummy variables: Enviro1=1 if years equal 1969-1974, else Enviro1=0; and 
Enviro2=1 if years equal 1989-1994, else Enviro2=0. Each of our dummy variables 
covers a slightly wider period than Lee et al. (2011): Our period 1969-1974 instead of 
their 1970-1973; and our period 1989-1994 instead of their 1990-1993. Our 




impending changes in policy were forecastable by the firms as the regulations went 
through extensive legislative discussions; hence an earlier start year of 1969. And 
some of the effects on innovation took more time to materialize; hence a slightly 
expanded terminal year for the dummy, 1974. Similarly for Enviro2 covering the 
period 1989-1994. The Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards also 
affected product development, engine design, among other changes. In terms of 
practical implications, while the standards for passenger cars went into effect earlier, 
the high fuel economy standard of 27.5MPG was effective starting 1990, with the next 
increase to 30.5MPG in 2011. The key item, the high standard of 27.5MPG, is roughly 
covered by our Enviro2 dummy (1989-1994), and overlaps with Lee et al. (2011) 
discussion of emissions standards. As Enviro1 and Enviro2 are general effects, 
potentially affecting all firms, we include these as controls in all specification we 
estimate; 
(b) Daimler-Chrysler merger (Merger). This was an important event in this industry 
involving two large and prominent firms. In our data description we provide details of 
our adjustments to the data to account for this merger. 
(c) GM’s bankruptcy (Bankruptcy). Bankruptcy=1 if year 2009-2012, else 
Bankruptcy=0. The dummy variable covers GM’s bankruptcy period. Our prior is that 
financial stress and significant losses had the potential to negatively affect GM’s 
innovation activities. Since the Bankruptcy dummy is specific to GM, we include this 




(d) Voluntary Export Restraints (VER). VER=1 if year equals 1981-1985, else 
VER=0. VERs were negotiated between the U.S. and Japanese Governments to 
restrict exports of automobiles from Japan to the U.S. for the specified period. While 
we are not aware of a study that directly links VER to patenting, our conjecture is that 
it had the potential to alter firms’ incentives to innovate. As VER is a general effect 
potentially affecting all firms, we include this as a control in all specifications; and 
(e) Business cycles (GDP). We include GDP as there is an important literature that 
has examined the cyclicality of firms’ innovation activities, and effects of business 
cycles on R&D and patenting: e.g., Geroski and Walters (1995), Guellec and 
Ioannidis (1997), Barlevy (2007), Ouyang(2011), and Aghion et al. (2012). 
 In addition to the above, our estimated specification (5) includes two important 
controls: (a) a firm-specific intercept ; and (b) lagged firm-specific patents . 
The fixed-effect  controls for unobserved firm-specific long-run differences in 
patenting across firms. This provides a control for some of the findings in the 
literature related to considerable variation in automobile firms’ organizational 
structure, innovation and productivity strategies, and outcomes: e.g., Lieberman et al. 
(1990), Lieberman and Demeester (1999), Lieberman and Dhawan (2005), and Lee et 
al.(2011, 2010).  
 The lagged-dependent variable  is a critical control for the intertemporal 
dynamics of firms’ patenting. It controls for at least two key aspects. First, it controls 




 shows persistence, or path-dependence, and we omit , the resulting 
slope coefficients in the estimated specification can be misleading. Second,  
serves as a control for an important omitted firm-specific time-varying factor that may 
influence the path of  – firms’ R&D expenditures. R&D is a key control in 
patent production function specifications (e.g., Hall and Ziedonis 2001, Kortum and 
Lerner 2000, and the literature surveyed there). Unfortunately, we do not have data on 
the firms’ R&D spending. Our attempts to obtain a consistent time-series for the nine 
firms in our sample were unsuccessful. The primary problem lies with obtaining R&D 
data for the foreign firms, some of which are not publicly traded in the U.S. exchanges. 
Our full sample contains nine firms with time-series data for 44 years (1969-2012). Of 
the total 396 firm-years of observations, R&D data were not available (from 
Compustat North America or Global, and other firm-level databases) for 158 
firm-years. However,  provides an indirect control for R&D in specification 
(5). 
 To examine R&D expenditures, consider (6) which represents a baseline patent 
production function model relating patents to R&D (e.g., Hausman et al., 1984; 
Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001): 
6 		 &  
Converting (6) to log-linear form we get:	




In (7),  is the firm-specific fixed-effect, and &  is time-varying firm-specific 
R&D expenditures. As discussed by Hall and Ziedonis (2001) and numerous other 
papers in this literature, using deeper lags of R&D provide no useful information 
beyond including the most current R&D data. Hall and Ziedonis (p.113) write: 
“This literature largely concludes that the lag structure is very poorly identified 
because of the high within-firm correlation of R&D spending over time.  When many 
lags are included in the model, the estimate of the sum of the coefficients is roughly 
the same as the estimated coefficient of contemporaneous R&D when no lags are 
included … Experimentation with lag structures using these data confirmed the 
results in the earlier literature.  For this reason … we use contemporaneous levels of 
R&D spending in our specifications.” 
 Given this, the basic specification (7) mimics the core relationship between R&D 
and patents. Specification (7) lagged one period gives us (7’): 
7′ 		 & .  
Our specification (5) includes the lagged-dependent variable . Substituting 
(7’) into (5) implies that the coefficient  in specification (5) embeds the 
intertemporal dynamic effects of firms’ R&D on patents, by accounting for the term 
&  from (7’). 
 We note two additional points. First, any systematic steady-state differences 
across firms in their patenting profile is captured by the firm-specific fixed-effect . 




steady-state differences in their patenting, it would be controlled by . Second, 
specification (5) includes real GDP growth. Given that the literature indicates that 
innovation activities of firms and their R&D has a cyclical component, the GDP 
growth terms control for these cyclical effects. 
 While due to lack of consistent and complete data we cannot include R&D 
directly in specification (5), it incorporates important indirect controls for firms’ R&D 
expenditures by including ,  and GDP growth. 
 Finally, we experimented with including deeper lags of SHR and HHI. First, the 
deeper lags of  are highly correlated in the data. For example, the overall 
correlation between  and  for the nine firms in our sample is about 
0.95. Examining the firm’s individually, the correlations are: GM (0.975), Ford 
(0.946), Chrysler (0.835), Toyota (0.983), Honda (0.988), Nissan (0.947), VW 
(0.918), BMW (0.985), and Daimler (0.982). The same problem exists with HHI. 
Including these lags produced a very high degree of collinearity between these deeper 
lags. Second, and more importantly, when we estimated specification (5) with the two 
lags entered separately, the second lag was typically insignificant, and did not have 
any meaningful contribution to explain movements in . Given these, we do not 
include deeper lags in our estimated specifications. 
 We present two sets of dynamic panel data estimates for specification (5): (a) 
include all the nine firms. Given that our data cover the period 1969-2012, this gives 




German firms’ patenting profiles, we re-estimate (5) by excluding the German firms. 
We do not interact the variables in specification (5) by country dummies - For 
parsimony, each included variable in specification (5) would have to be interacted 
with a country dummy. This produced significant collinearity between the included 
variables and then those variables interacted with the country dummies. Since this 
produces misleading inferences, we avoid this strategy. 
3.2.2 Own Market Shares, Main Rivals’ Market Shares, and Patents 
 Over our sample period, the Japanese firms have surged in the extent of 
competition they have offered to both the US and German firms. They have basically 
out-competed the US firms and Volkswagen in the mass produced segment, and have 
offered stiff competition to BMW and Daimler, and GM’s Cadillac, for the 
higher-end or luxury cars. Given this, we consider the Japanese firms as the “main” 
rivals of both the US and German firms. Since our data are for the US market, we 
consider the US firms as the “main” rivals for the Japanese firms due to the extensive 
overlap in the mass-produced segment, as well as them having a home-market 
advantage. Examining this might provide additional insights into the complex 
interaction between competition and patenting. 
 To examine this, we drop HHI from specification (5) and replace it with the 
market shares of “Other-Country:Main” rivals. The U.S. (Japanese) firms’ 
other-country main rivals are the Japanese (U.S.) firms.  For the German firms, we 




firms’ luxury segments competing with the German firms, as well as with 
Volkswagen in the mass-produced segment. Our segmentation is also broadly 
consistent with some of the findings on important differences between, for example, 
U.S. and Japanese firms (E.g., Lieberman et al.,1990; Lieberman and 
Demeester ,1999; and Lieberman and Dhawan,2005).   
 The estimated specification is: 
8 		
: . 
As in specification (5), 	is the vector of other control variables. In section 5 we 
provide details about our estimation methods. 
3.3 Data Description 
 In our analysis of the impact of competition on patenting in the U.S. automobile 
market, we examine data over a 44-year period, 1969-2012. We use 1969 as the start 
year as that was the first year we could get consistent market share data on all the 
firms in our sample. The starting date is also important as the late-1960s and early 
1970s were important in this industry due to the introduction of emissions and other 
regulatory controls, as well as the oil price shocks starting 1973. And 2012 was the 
most recent year for which data were available when we started this project. We 
examine data on nine firms: GM, Ford, Chrysler, Toyota, Honda, Nissan, 
Volkswagen, BMW, and Daimler. This set covers the big-three U.S., Japanese, and 




U.S. market, our reasons for restricting it to the nine prominent firms were as follows. 
First, some of the data we use were consistently available only for these nine firms. 
For several of the other firms we considered, there were gaps in the data on market 
shares and sales.  Second, the main new entrants in the U.S. market, Hyundai and Kia, 
were meaningful players only towards the end of our sample period, and their data 
were incomplete or missing for many of the earlier periods. Third, over our sample 
period (1969-2012), the nine firms on average accounted for approximately 91% of 
the sales in the U.S. market, therefore accounting for the vast majority of sales. Given 
this, we restricted our sample to the nine firms to allow us to do a thorough analysis 
with complete data on each firm. 
 It could be argued that BMW and Daimler are luxury brands, and therefore not 
directly comparable to the other firms. The counter arguments are that Toyota, Nissan, 
and Honda all have their distinct luxury divisions – Lexus, Infinity and Acura. While 
the luxury segment is relatively weak for the U.S. firms, Cadillac, for example, is 
GM’s luxury segment. In addition, we note that Toyota’s patents, for example, are 
reported under Toyota Motor Co. and not separately under Toyota and Lexus. So, for 
the mass market firms, there is no way to segment their patents into the mass produced 
versus luxury divisions. Moreover, Japanese firms, for example, often use the same 
platform design, engines, among other components, across their mass-produced and 
luxury lineups.  Given these considerations, we decided to keep BMW and Daimler 




data estimates using all nine firms, as well as by grouping firms by countries, allowing 
us to look at results with and without the German firms. 
3.3.1 Patents 
 For the period 1969-2012, we collected data on patents for the nine firms from the 
U.S. Patent Office (USPTO). We use successful (granted) patent applications for our 
analysis. To obtain the total number of patents for each firm, we had to address a 
couple of important issues related to Ford Motors, and the Daimler-Chrysler merger.  
 For Ford Motors, the total patents assigned appear under: (i) Ford Motor Co.; and 
(ii) their technology subsidiary Ford Global Technologies. After 1997, the vast 
majority of patents for Ford are assigned to this technology subsidiary. Given this, we 
add the patents for Ford Motor Co. and Ford Global Technologies to obtain the total 
patents for Ford. This creates a consistent time series for all patents for Ford Motors. 
 The merger between Chrysler and Daimler was an important event. They merged 
on (November 12) 1998 and broke up on (May 14) 2007. The merger resulted in the 
total number of patents for both companies dropping to zero as all new patents were 
assigned to the new entity ‘DaimlerChrysler.’ Chrysler and Daimler began to have 
their own patents assigned again after the break up in 2007. To address this issue, one 
option for us was to drop both Chrysler and Daimler from the sample. But this is not 
desirable as it would result in omission of two large and important firms from the 
sample. Another option was to include a merger dummy to cover the roughly 9 year 




extended merger period would reduce our ability to understand the intertemporal 
dynamics of competition and patenting. Instead, we use the approach noted below to 
create a merger-adjusted patents time-series for Chrysler and Daimler. 
First, over the 10-year period 1989-1998,4 we compute the total number of patents for 
Chrysler and Daimler: . Next we calculate the fraction of total patents 
accounted for by each company during this 10-year pre-merger period: 
⁄  and ⁄ . These two ratios 
‘roughly’ indicate the individual firms’ patent shares in the pre-merger period, if the 
two firms were actually combined. Our data indicate that while there is a small 
amount of variation in these two fractions, they appear relatively stable over the 
10-year pre-merger period. To smooth out shorter-run, year-to-year, variations in this 
ratio, we use the average fraction from the 10-year pre-merger period. The values of 
these pre-merger ratios are: =0.45, and 
⁄ =0.55. Next, we assume that over the actual merged 
period, the true share of patents accruing to Chrysler remains at 0.45. Using this, we 
assign 0.45 of the merged DaimlerChrysler entity’s total patents to Chrysler, and the 
remaining 0.55 to Daimler. Using this procedure, we create a merger-adjusted 
continuous time-series in the patents granted to Chrysler and Daimler over the period 
they were merged.  
                                                 
4 We treat this as the pre-merger period in our calculations below. While the merger was consummated on 
(November 12) 1998, DaimlerChrysler began to have patents assigned to this merged entity starting 1999. 
Therefore, using 1998 as the terminal year to do our calculations does not affect our analysis. As we note later, 




 After the merger broke up in 2007, some patents continued to be granted to the 
combined DaimlerChrysler entity during 2008-2010 due to the administrative and 
legal processes. For the period 2008-2010, we use the same procedure as noted above 
to separate the patents assigned to DaimlerChrysler and allocate those to Chrysler and 
Daimler. 
 In combination, our above procedure gives us a merger-adjusted time-series in 
patents for Chrysler and Daimler for the full sample period, 1969-2012. Apart from 
the 1989-1998 based calculations noted above, we experimented with a five year 
period 1994-1998, as well as redoing the calculations by leaving out the year 1998. 
The merger-adjusted time-series we create are not sensitive to the exact pre-merger 
years we consider to do our calculations. 
 Even after making the above adjustments to create a continuous time-series for 
patents for Chrysler and Daimler, there is a discrete jump in patenting for both firms 
around the period 1998-2002. This is not the entire merger period 1998-2007, but a 
sub-period. Before 1998 and after 2003, each firm’s series looks in conformity with 
their longer-run patterns. There appears to be some merger-related complexities over 
the period 1998-2002 that are not being fully captured by our adjustment. While the 
exact analysis and effects of the merger on the firms’ innovation is beyond the scope 
of this paper, we control for this phenomenon by including a merger dummy 




specific to Chrysler and Daimler, we include this as an additional control for those 
two firms only.5  
 
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics: Patents 
 
Notes:  ,  and CV are the mean, standard deviation and coefficient of variation (percent) of 
the total number of patents (for the 9 firms), and for each firm. 
  
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics for the patents data. The sample 
average number of patents for GM, Ford, Toyota, and Honda are relatively close at 
333, 260, 277, and 351, respectively. Chrysler has the lowest patent profile of the 
three U.S. firms, and Nissan the lowest among the Japanese firms. Daimler, the most 
active German firm, has a sample mean of 111 patents, which is almost four times 
larger than VW or BMW. The sample averages conceal important underlying 
dynamics. Two Japanese firms, Toyota and Honda, have aggressive patenting profiles 
                                                 
5 We do not consider other mergers during our sample period, such as those of Volvo (by Ford) and Saab (by GM), 
as these were very small firms. Our examination of these mergers revealed very little impact on the acquiring 
firms. 
Firm   (%)
GM 332.7 145.8 44.3
Ford 259.8 127.5 49.1
Chrysler  78.3 61.7 78.8
Toyota 277.0 240.3 86.8
Honda 351.0 308.2 87.8
Nissan 216.3 95.5 44.2
VW 25.2 12.7 50.4
BMW 27.5 27.8 101.1







during the latter half of the sample period during which they surpass the peaks of GM. 
The German firms individually, or as country total, have relatively stable profiles. 
 
 
Notes: The data for the US are the sum of USPTO patents for GM, Ford and Chrysler. Japan, for 
Toyota, Honda and Nissan. Germany, for Volkswagen, BMW and Daimler.  
Figure 3.1 Automobile Firms’ USPTO Patents – Grouped by Country 
  
Figure 3.1 plots the firms’ USPTO patents – grouped as country totals. Overall, 
the U.S. total shows relative stability. The two big deviations in the U.S. totals come 
around 1970-1974 (mainly due to sharp increase in GM’s patents, potentially related 
to the Clean Air Act) and 2008-2010 (entirely due to drop in GM’s patents during its 
bankruptcy period). In contrast, the Japanese patents show sharp acceleration towards 
the end of our sample period. This is almost entirely driven by spikes in patenting by 
Toyota and Honda. The German profile is one of relative low and stable patenting. 
The increase in the German profile around 1999 to 2002 is entirely due to an increase 




































































































 An intriguing feature is the three German firms’ low total patent counts compared 
to the U.S. or Japanese firms. Daimler, the most active firm of the three German 
companies, has a peak of 250 patents in 2000, which is still much lower than the 
averages of GM and Ford, and even lower than the average of the Japanese firms in 
1985. For VW and BMW, their total numbers of patents are consistently low. This is 
puzzling given the reputation of the German firms’ innovative capabilities. 
 It is clearly the case that the U.S. market is very important to the German 
automobile firms. Over our sample period, BMW has sold roughly 23%-28% of its 
global production in the U.S. market. A similar significance holds for Daimler. In 
terms of profits, a similar fact holds where the high-demand and high-income U.S. 
market has been historically important for BMW and Daimler. Given this, one would 
expect the German firms to have a healthy patenting profile in this important market, 
much like the Japanese. While the lower patenting profile of the German firms is 
rather curious, we were unable to find explanation of this in the literature in spite of 
extensive searching. 
 To examine if our USPTO automotive patents data on the German firms were an 
aberration, we examined data from the OECD database containing country-total 
triadic patents. Note that these are not just automotive patents, but all patents from 
each country. Figure 3.2 plots the country-total triadic patents. It is clear that 
Germany’s country total triadic patents are an order of magnitude lower than either 
U.S. or Japan. Figure 3.2 shows that the U.S. and Japanese county total triadic patents 




specific differences, our USPTO-based auto patents (displayed in Figure 1) are not an 
aberration. German patents appear to be systematically lower. 
 
 
Notes: The country triadic patent totals data are from the OECD patents database (1985-2012). These 
are all patents by country (not just automobile).  
Figure 3.2 OECD Country Total Triadic Patents – All Patents 
  
We end this section with a comment linking the observations from the data to our 
econometric estimation. Our patents specification (5) – see section 3 – includes a 
firm-specific fixed-effect  which controls for the long-run steady-state differences 
in firms’ mean levels of patents – noted in the summary statistics presented in Table 3. 
Whatever firm-specific reason exists to generate different levels across the firms,  
controls for it. What is important for estimation of the slope coefficients is whether 
there are intertemporal fluctuations in patents. Examining table 3, we see that the 















German firms have lower levels of patenting compared to their U.S. and Japanese 
counterparts, the coefficient of variation of the German firms’ patents are comparable 
to the other firms. 
3.3.2 Market Share and HHI 
 Data on sales in the U.S. and market shares are from Ward’s Automotive. Ward’s 
offers the most comprehensive and historical data on U.S. market sales. According to 
the data on total light vehicles sales from Ward’s Auto, the nine firms in our sample 
dominate the automobile industry with an average market share of 91% over the 
sample period 1969 to 2012.  
 
Table 3.2 Summary Statistics: Market Shares and HHI 
Firm   (%) 
GM 34.3 8.6 25.1
Ford 22.2 3.9 17.5
Chrysler 12.6 1.8 14.3
Toyota 7.8 4.3 54.8
Honda 5.0 3.2 63.7
Nissan 4.6 1.7 36.9
VW 2.2 1.1 50.2
BMW 0.8 0.7 85.7
Daimler 1.1 0.7 67.3
HHI (9 firm) 2066.4 580.9 28.1
Notes: ,  and CV are the mean, standard deviation and coefficient of variation (percent) of 
HHI, and the market shares of each firm. HHI is calculated based on the 9 firms in our sample. 
  
Table 3.2 presents the summary statistics on market shares. The sample averages 




the lowest shares. In terms of the underlying dynamics of market shares, the three U.S. 
firms combined started with a high market share of around 80% in 1969, but this 
drops to about 45% by 2012. Among the U.S. firms, GM suffered the largest loss of 
market share. While Ford and Chrysler also had declining shares, they had relatively 
more stable market share profiles compared to GM. The Japanese firms started with a 
low market share of about 2% in 1969, and increased to about 35% by 2012. While all 
three Japanese firms increased their shares, Toyota was perhaps the most successful in 
challenging GM and Ford. After 2006, Toyota had a market share around 15%, which 
was close to Ford, and was only about 5% lower than GM in 2010. While the low 
shares of BMW and Daimler are understandable as they operate in the luxury segment, 
the low market share of Volkswagen, a mass market firm, reveals significant failure to 
compete with either the U.S. or the Japanese firms. The total market share of the three 
German firms was about 5% in 1969, declined to about 2% in the mid-1990s, and then 
increased to about 7% by 2012. Volkswagen had a market share of about 5% in 1969, 
reached a low of about 0.5% in 1993, before recovering and increasing to 3% in 2012. 
Like the U.S. firms, Volkswagen lost ground to the Japanese firms. In recent years, 
the high-end luxury brands BMW and Daimler have been at par with the mass-market 
Volkswagen in their U.S. market shares. VW’s historic problems are also current ones. 
As noted in Forbes (07/03/2014): “Volkswagen has been and continues to be in a new 
product drought. It simply doesn’t have the vehicles or the breadth of product 




arguments about VW’s failure in America are that its model line is too limited and the 
amount of successful competition is too great. The problems converge.” 
As noted above, the nine firms in our sample have accounted for approximately 
91% of the U.S. sales over our sample period, 1969-2012, representing the dominant 
portion of the market. In our estimated specification (5), we use individual firms’ 
market shares as well as a market-wide indicator of competitiveness. For this we 
construct the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI). Using data on the nine firms, 
∑ , 1,… ,9,	where si denotes the firm’s market share.6 This gives us 
a time series in HHI for the 44 years in our sample. For the period 1969-1979, the HHI 
fluctuated around a mean value of about 2,750, with the highest recorded value 
around 3,000. After 1979, the HHI declines steadily, with the only noticeable 
difference coming in the 1986-1995 period when it remained relatively flat around 
2,000. It declines to a low of about 1,000 in 2012. While the starting value of about 
3000 is not particularly high for oligopolistic markets, the decline over the sample 
period reflects a marked increase in the degree of competition in the market. As the 
nine firms in our sample remain in the market for the full 44-year period, the change in 
the HHI is largely due to the reallocation of market shares away from the U.S. and 
towards the Japanese firms. 
                                                 
6 As we do not have detailed financial data for the firms over our sample period, we were not able to construct 
even an approximate measure of profitability. As we noted earlier, since several of the firms are not traded in the 
U.S. stock markets, or have been traded relatively recently, creating a consistent database of their economic and 




3.4 Estimation Results 
We estimate the panel models with all nine firms in our sample, as well as a 
sub-sample that excludes the German firms. We noted earlier that patenting by 
German firms is much lower compared to the US or Japanese firms. While our 
empirical model includes a firm fixed-effect as well as a lagged dependent variable to 
control for firm-specific long-term and dynamic effects, estimating without the 
German firms provides a check of robustness of our overall results.    
 In terms of estimation methods, we are cognizant of the fact that our panel has 
somewhat different characteristics as compared to typical panels which have large N 
and relatively small T. Our full panel has relatively small N (9) and larger T (44). 
Under these characteristics, the GMM estimators may not produce the most efficient 
parameter estimates – although the precise extent of inefficiency in our case is 
difficult to determine. To address this, along with the GMM estimates, we also report 
the more conventional instrumental variables (IV) estimates which are less subject to 
the efficiency problems. By presenting both the GMM and IV estimates, we check for 
the robustness of our inferences. As we note below, our key results are not sensitive to 
using GMM versus IV. 
3.4.1 Potential Endogeneity 
 In specification (5), the  explanatory variable is lagged one period. This 
reduces any obvious endogeneity issue between a firm’s own market share and 




 may lead to potentially complex reverse causality issues. The general issue of 
reverse causality has been noted in the literature. Blundell et al. (1999), for example, 
note that instead of increasing innovations, market shares could be increased by 
innovation because firms that innovate will grow and therefore have higher market 
shares. To formally examine this, we conducted econometric causality tests. We 
implement two of the more commonly used tests, by Granger (1969) and Geweke, 
Meese and Dent (1983). For a given firm, the Granger test uses specification (9) to test 
for econometric exogeneity: 
9 	 	 . 
The test includes m-lags of the firm’s own market share (SHR) to capture the 
variable’s own dynamics, and n-lags of the firm’s own patents (PAT) to examine 
reverse causality. The null hypothesis is: 0	∀	 . 
 We test for econometric exogeneity by estimating specification (9) firm-by-firm. 
Our examination of lag lengths showed that two lags were sufficient (i.e., m=2, n=2); 
higher-order lags were not significant, and adding them did not change the testing 
results reported below. For the 9 firms in our sample, the F-static (p-values) from the 
Granger test are: GM 1.95 (0.156); Ford 0.82 (0.445); Chrysler 0.34 (0.711); Toyota 
2.56 (0.091); Honda 3.01 (0.062); Nissan 1.30 (0.284); Volkswagen 0.84 (0.437); 
BMW 3.51 (0.040); and Daimler 0.07 (0.932). Based on these test results we reject the 




(1983) test uses a different specification structure compared to Granger, and the 
estimated specification is:  
∑ ∑ ∑ .  
The specification includes k-lags and w-leads of SHR, and controls for the 
variable’s own dynamics via lagged-dependent variables. The null is: q 0	∀	w; 
i.e., future values of SHR do not influence current PAT. The results were largely 
similar. To account for the potential endogeneity of SHR for the firms noted above, 
the dynamic panel estimation methodology we adopt – GMM and IV – includes a full 
set of instruments (see notes to the tables).  
 In addition, we also tested for the potential endogeneity of the HHI in 
specification (5). The argument here being that significant innovations by a firm can 
potentially alter the market structure. The HHI in specification (5) is lagged one 
period, and this reduces any obvious endogeneity issues. We used the Granger and the 
Geweke et al. procedures to test for potential endogeneity of HHI. The tests do not 
reject the null of econometric exogeneity of HHI. 
3.4.2 Own Market Share and HHI Estimates 
 Results from estimating specification (5) are in Table 3.3. Next, in table 3.4, we 
present estimates from a modified specification: from the model in table 3.3, we drop 
the variables Enviro1, Enviro2, VER and HHI, and replace these with year time 




better capture all effects that are common across firms in a given year. This allows us 





Table 3.3 Own Market Share and HHI 



















































































Firm Fixed-Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No No No No 
Observations 378 252 378 252 
Notes: 
1. Estimated specification is (see chapter 3.2): 
5 		 . 
The variables are: 
 : Number of patents for firm i in year t; 
 : Firm-specific fixed-effect; 
 : Market share of firm i, lagged one period; 
 : Herfindahl index, lagged one period; 
 : vector of control variables Enviro1, Enviro2, VER, Bankruptcy, and Merger.  
2. Estimation in column 1 and 2 are via the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses, and ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The 
‘All’ sample includes the 9 firms in our sample, and the All-German samples include the 6 U.S. and 
Japanese firms. The annual data for each firm covers the period 1969-2012. Two initial observations 
are dropped due to taking lags and the first-differencing procedure of the estimator.  
3. The results of the specification tests for columns 1 and 2 are as follows. 
(a) Over-identification test  (p-value). Column 1: 335.29 (0.516). Column 2: 255.88 (0.135).  
(b) Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors are as follows. Column 1: 
Order=1: z=-2.40 (p=0.017). Column 2: Order=1: z= -2.09 (p=0.036).  






Table 3.3 (continued) 
4. Estimation in column 3 and 4 are via the IV estimator. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses, and ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Two initial 
observations are dropped due to taking lags and using deeper lags of the estimator as IV. 
	  and  are treated as endogenous, , , , 




Table 3.4 Own Market Share 












































Firm Fixed-Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 378 252 378 252 
Notes: 
1. See table 3.3 for general comments. 
2. Compared to table 3.3, in the above table we replace Enviro1, Enviro2, VER and HHI by year time 
dummies. 
3. The results of the GMM specification tests for columns 1 and 2 are as follows. 
(a) Over-identification test  (p-value). Column 1: 306.56 (0.464). Column 2: 226.46 (0.074).  
(b) Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors are as follows. Column 1: 
Order=1: z=-2.42 (p=0.015). Column 2: Order=1: z= -2.10 (p=0.035).  
(c) Wald  (p-value): Column 1: 33.59 (0.000). Column 2: 12.96 (0.024). 
4. In columns 3 and 4,	  and   are treated as endogenous. , 







 As we discuss the results below, one important aspect of our results to keep in 
mind is that they are not sensitive to the specific estimation method used – GMM or 
conventional IV.   
Path-dependence of patenting 
 The coefficient of the lagged-dependent variable is positive and highly 
significant, indicating persistence in the path of firms’ patents. The estimated 
elasticities are approximately 0.7 (they are marginally higher at about 0.8 in table 3.4). 
The lagged-dependent variable elasticities indicate considerable path-dependence in 
firms’ patenting. This is not surprising as we expect firms’ R&D processes, and 
innovation and patenting strategy to show some continuity at least in the 
short-to-medium term. 
Own market share effects 
 One of the main variables from theory is firms’ own market share. In table 3.3, 
the full-panel estimate of the own market share elasticity is 0.13, and statistically 
significant. Given the standard errors, the point estimates are not statistically different 
across the various specifications reported in tables 3.3 and 3.4.This implies that for 
the typical firm in our sample, an increase in market share leads to higher patenting.  
 Next, in table 3.5 and table 3.6 we present the quantitative effects. In both these 
tables, if the underlying GMM coefficient estimate in table 3.3 was statistically 
insignificant, we assign a value of zero to that effect. In table 3.5 we present the actual 




from its sample mean value. And in table 3.6 we present the corresponding percentage 
change in patents if own market share increases by one standard deviation, starting 
from its sample mean value. Across the various specifications estimated, the 
calculations in tables 3.5 and 3.6 show that increase (decrease) in own market share 
results in an increase (decrease) in patents by about 25-30 (or about 10%-14%).  
 
Table 3.5. Estimated Quantitative Effects – Actual Change: Own Market Share and HHI 








Table 3.3.  
   23 29 25 33 
   -40 -65 -29 -72 
Table 3.4. With Year Dummies 
   25 22 25 30 
Notes: 
1. Calculations are based on the GMM estimates from table 3.3 and 3.4. Only the main variables of 
interest are reported to save space.  
2. Estimated quantitative effects (as the actual changes in variables) are based on considering a 
one-standard-deviation change in the relevant independent variable. If the underlying coefficient 
estimates were insignificant in table 3.3, we assign a value zero to that effect. The estimated 
quantitative effects are computed as follows. Given the elasticity (significant coefficients in table 3.3), 
when independent variable x changes from ̅ to ̅ , the change in value of  (starting 





Table 3.6. Estimated Quantitative Effects – Percentage Change: Own Market Share and HHI 









   13.95% 9.28% 14.96% 10.49% 
   -6.01% -7.18% -4.31% -7.91% 
Table 3.4. With Year Dummies 
   15.30% 6.94% 14.85% 9.60% 
Notes: 
1. Calculations are based on the GMM estimates from table 3.3 and 3.4. Only the main variables of 
interest are reported to save space. The estimated quantitative effects (as percentage changes) are 
based on considering a one-standard-deviation change in the relevant independent variable. If the 
underlying coefficient estimates were insignificant in table 3.3, we assign a value zero to that effect. 
 
 
 Finally, in table 3.7 we present the short-run versus long-run elasticities. 
Calculation of the long-run elasticities uses the estimates of the short-run elasticities 
from table 3.3, and the estimate of the patents’ path-dependence parameter (the lagged 
dependent variable). The computed long-run elasticity is an order of magnitude larger 
than the short-run elasticity, implying that an increase in market share has a markedly 





Table 3.7. Estimated Elasticities: Own Market Share 









  Short-run 0.124** 0.115** 0.133*** 0.130** 
  Long-run 0.482** 0.507** 0.605*** 0.510** 
Table 3.4. With Year Dummies 
  Short-run 0.136** 0.086* 0.132*** 0.119*** 
  Long-run 0.648** 0.439* 0.614*** 0.500*** 
Notes:  
1. Short-run elasticities are the estimated coefficients for  reported in table 3.3 and 3.4. 
(As the specification is estimated in log-linear form, the coefficients are interpreted as elasticities.) 
An asterisk * indicates that the estimate is significant (see table 3.3 and 3.4). 
2. Long-run elasticities are calculated as follows: , where  is the estimated coefficient of 
 (specification 5) and is the estimated coefficient of the lagged-dependent variable 
. 
  
Overall, and based on our discussion in chapter 2.1, our findings are similar in 
spirit to those in Blundell et al. (1995, 1999), Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999) and 
Lee et al. (2011). In addition, our study sheds some light on potential nonlinearities in 
the relationship between market shares and patenting which we explore in greater 
detail below. 
Market-wide competition (HHI) effects 
 Our second key variable from theory is market-wide competition. Our measure is 
the HHI – a reduction in HHI indicates greater competition. The elasticity estimates 
from table 3.3 average around -0.25. This indicates that greater overall competition in 
the market increases firms’ patenting. Our finding that an increase in market 
competition stimulates total innovation is similar in spirit to the results in, for example, 




Audretsch (1988), Blundell et al. (1995, 1999), Blind et al. (2006), Aghion et al. 
(2005), and Hu (2010). Our findings do not support Schumpeter (1934, 1942), Loury 
(1979), Delbono and Denicolo (1991), and Hashmi (2013), where greater competition 
reduces innovation. Our findings also do not favor Scherer (1965), Levin and Reiss 
(1984), Scott (1984), and Levin et al. (1985) where market power had no effect on 
innovation. 
Nonlinearity in the Relationship between Competition and Patents 
 Earlier we noted the results in Aghion et al. (2001) and Aghion et al. (2005) 
predicting a nonlinear, inverted-U shaped, relationship between competition and 
innovation. Aghion et al. (2005) find some evidence of a nonlinear relationship 
between competition and patenting. The Aghion et al. (2005, p.703-705) data are 
fairly aggregated 2-digit industry-level panel with 17 industries covering the time 
period 1973-1994 (354 industry-year observations in their unbalanced panel). The 
economic and financial data they use for the U.K. industries are U.K.-based. However, 
the patents data they use are from the USPTO (See their data details, p.703-705). They 
write that their patents data are from the (p.704): “…U. S. patent office, which is where 
innovations are effectively patented internationally.” But as we see from our data, 
foreign firms’ propensities to patent in the U.S. varies substantively both across firms 
and over time. Next they construct a 2-digit industry-average accounting 
profit-margin. They do not calculate the price-marginal cost Lerner index. Instead 
they construct a 2-digit industry-average measure of operating profits net of 




(p.704-705). It is perhaps useful to note that a 2-digit industry contains myriad types 
of industries, underlying technologies, and markets, which are often not easily 
comparable. As an example, the 2-digit category 37 is ‘Transportation Equipment’ 
and includes such myriad industries and markets such as ‘Motor Vehicle Parts and 
Accessories’, ‘Railroad Equipment’, ‘Boat Building and Repairing’, ‘Guided 
Missiles and Space Vehicles’, ‘Aircraft Engines and Engine Parts’, among others. 
Given such disparate industries, it is difficult to assign meaning to an 
industry-average measure of profitability. Then they empirically examine the 
relationship to find a moderately inverted-U relationship. 
 Hashmi’s (2013) study generates a side-by-side comparison with Aghion et al. 
(2005). His data for the U.S. cover the years 1976 to 2001, with 116 industries at the 
3-digit industry classification (for his 2-digit level there are 20 industries). Using U.S. 
industry data, he finds a moderately negative relationship between product market 
competition and patenting, and no evidence to support an inverted-U relationship. For 
the U.S. data, as competition increases, patenting falls at a mildly diminishing rate. In 
sharp contrast, the U.K. industry data reveals a mildly inverted U-shaped relationship, 
and, in general, patenting increases with greater competition. 
 Aghion et al. (2005) and Hashmi (2013), therefore, show diametrically opposite 
results. So even with these more sophisticated models and estimated specifications, 
the evidence on both the sign of the relationship between competition and patenting, 




summary of the empirical literature in chapter 2.1 – which reveals no conclusive 
results relating competition to innovation. 
 There are important differences between the above studies and ours. First, in 
contrast to the relatively aggregated 2-digit industry level data used by Aghion et al. 
(2005), our sample contains firm-level data for a single industry. Second, the time 
period for their study is 1973-1994. In contrast, ours is a much longer period, 
1969-2012. Third, they construct an industry-average accounting profit-margin to 
proxy industry-wide competitiveness. Ours, in contrast, uses the HHI to proxy 
competitiveness. We do not have financial information for the firms for the full 
sample period, and therefore cannot construct a Lerner index. Fourth, their studies, 
being at the 2-digit industry level, do not contain both firms’ market shares and 
industry measure of competitiveness. Given our more disaggregated study, we control 
for both firms’ market shares and HHI, allowing us to examine the conditional 
relationships. Fifth, models like Aghion et al. may often be difficult to test as the 
degree of competition may not traverse the full spectrum – high degree of competition 
to near monopoly. The U.S. automobile market we study essentially moves from a 
tighter oligopoly (higher HHI, when the U.S. firms had dominant market share) to a 
looser oligopoly (lower HHI, with the expansion of the Japanese firms’ market 
shares). Given these substantive differences in data characteristics, direct 
comparisons between their study and ours is not possible. 
 Our estimated specification (5) is log-linear, and therefore builds in non-linearity 




figure 3.3 panel (a) we plot the estimated relationship between firms’ market shares 
and patents, and panel (b) the estimated relationship between HHI and patents. From 
panel (a) we see that the estimated patents increase with market shares, and the 
curvature is much sharper initially. Over the range of firms’ market shares observed in 
the data (from about 1% to 46%), the estimated patents go from about 75 (per year) to 
225 (per year).  For the HHI effect in panel (b), the curvature is very mild, and over 
the range of HHI observations in the data (from about 1,000 to 3,000), the estimated 
patents go from about 212 to 166. Consistent with the calculations presented in tables 
5.3 and 5.4, the quantitative effect on patents is much smaller for the HHI as 
compared to the market share effect. 
 
 Panel (a): Market Share                  Panel (b): HHI 
      
Note: In panel (a), estimated patents increase as firms’ market shares increase. In panel (b), estimated 
patents increase as HHI decreases – implying that as market-wide competitiveness increases (lower 
HHI), patenting increases. The above figures reflect the calculations from tables 5.3 and 5.4 where 
we see that the estimated quantitative effects for firms’ market shares are larger than for HHI. 














































































To provide a visual comparison, in figure 3.4 we present the figure from Hashmi 
which shows the side-by-side comparison using U.K. and U.S. 2-digit industry data. 
As we noted above, our results are not directly comparable to either Hashmi or 
Aghion et al. (2005) due to the substantial differences in data characteristics. Our HHI 
results – which shows that increase in market competition leads to increase in 
patenting – is closer to the findings by Aghion et al. However, if we look at the 
estimated relationship by Hashmi for the U.S. data, after the initial drop, there appears 
to be a flat relationship between his measure of competition and patents. In our case 




Note: This figure is reproduced from Hashmi (2013, p. 1659, Figure 1). The solid lines above 
represent the estimated relationship: Panel (a) is based on the U.K. data used in Aghion et al. (2005, 
ABBGH); and Panel (b) is based on the U.S. data. As noted in Hashmi (p.1655): “Prediction 1. There 
is an inverted-U relationship between product market competition and innovation.” (This is based on 
proposition 2 in Aghion et al., 2005, p.715.) The findings from the U.S. and U.K. data are 
diametrically opposite. Further, if we look at the U.S. figure, the estimated line is virtually flat above 
their competition measure 0.4. 




 Overall, we find evidence of non-linearity in the relationship between 
competition and patenting, and that an increase in market-wide competition (using 
HHI) results in marginally greater patenting. As we noted above, our data are not 
comparable to either Aghion et al. (2005) or Hashmi (2013). In addition, our 
estimated specifications are richer that the above studies as they include controls for 
both firms’ market shares and HHI, along with other controls. 
Other control variables 
 We briefly comment on our set of control variables. First, the ‘Bankruptcy’ 
variable was designed to control for GM’s problems during 2009-2012. The estimates 
show that GM’s patenting fell dramatically during the bankruptcy period. Given the 
dramatic internal organizational restructuring during this period, and potential 
financial problems, this is perhaps not surprising. 
 Second, the ‘Merger’ variable was designed to control for any residual effects of 
the merger between Daimler and Chrysler that were not addressed in our adjustments 
to the data to create a merger-adjusted continuous time-series for Chrysler and 
Daimler. We find that the merger generally appears to have increased patenting, but 
the statistical significance of the effect is mixed.  
 Third, the environmental variable Enviro1 (1969-1974) is always positive, but it 
is only significant for the GMM estimates. The general positive effect tallies with 
previous findings that the Clean Air Act increased innovation and patenting (e.g., Lee 




motivation for including the Enviro(.) effects was to control for potential 
environmental patents related findings of Lee et al. (2010, 2011). As we noted in 
section 3.1, our study is different from Lee at al. in that our focus is on the relationship 
between competition and total patents, and our sample period is also very different. 
However, our overall findings on Enviro(.) are similar in spirit to Lee at al. in that 
Enviro(.) matters, but the estimated effects vary across groups of firms, as well as 
across time periods. 
 Fourth, voluntary export restraints appear to have had no effect on the patenting 
activity. We did not have a clear prior on this variable, but included this as a control as 
it was an important event in the U.S. automobile market.  
Checks of robustness 
 Our estimation already builds in several checks and controls to ensure confidence 
that we are picking up meaningful parameter estimates for firms’ own market share 
and market-wide competitiveness effects. For example: (i) we tested our market share 
and HHI variables for endogeneity, and the estimation accounts for potential 
endogeneity; (ii) we presented alternative sets of estimates using GMM and 
fixed-effects instrumental variables procedures; and (iii) the estimated specification 
(5) contains a vector of control variables spanning environmental regulations, 
voluntary export restraints, the Daimler-Chrysler merger, GM’s bankruptcy, and 





 First, one potential shortcoming of our estimates reported in table 3.3 is that we 
could not include year-time dummies due to collinearity problems. To take another 
look at this issue, we carried out the following estimation by: (a) dropping Enviro1, 
Enviro2 and VER from specification (5); and (b) adding non-overlapping 4-year 
period dummies 1970-73, 1974-77, …., 2006-09, 2010-12. The last dummy is for 3 
years as 2012 is the last year in the sample. Our objective in including these period 
dummies was to, for example: (i) mimic year-time dummies, but with extended 
periods for each dummy; (ii) have the set of dummies cover the full sample period to 
capture any effects over time that could be related to, for example, environmental 
standards affecting all firms (a strategy similar to that employed in Lee et al. (2011); 
(iii) potentially control for any broad technological shifts that may have affected the 
automobile industry over time; and (iv) control for overall changes in the physical 
presence of foreign producers in the U.S. in terms of opening manufacturing plants, 
design studios, etc. Many of these operations tend to be staffed by Americans rather 
than Japanese, and they may give rise to, for example, intermingling of corporate 
cultures, management styles and innovation related spillovers. We also experimented 
with varying the time periods for the dummies noted in (b) above (for example, 3 or 5 
year periods), and these did not affect our inferences noted in table 3.3. 
 Second, given that we have a relatively long sample period of 44 years, a 
reasonable question to ask is whether the estimated slope coefficients of our main 
variables of interest,  and , are stable over time. To examine this we 




each sub-period. To formally test, we calculated the z-values. The z-statistic is based 
on Paternoster et al. (1998) who refine the test in Clogg et al. (1995). This allows 
testing the equality of coefficients in different models when one of the models is 
nested in the other. This is true in our case as some of the variables – such as Enviro1, 
Enviro1, VER, Merger and Bankruptcy – are relevant for the sub-periods used for 
testing the equality of coefficients, 1969-1990 or 1991-2012. We also carried out an 
alternative test by re-estimating specification (5) by adding a dummy variable to 
delineate the two sub-periods, as well as interacting this dummy with SHR and HHI, 
our main variables of interest. Using this procedure and testing resulted in the same 
conclusion – that we cannot reject the null of equality of coefficients: the z-values 
(p-values) are 0.04 (0.966) for  and 0.17 (0.868) for . Based on our 
tests, we could not reject the null for the equality of coefficients across the two 
sub-periods. 
3.4.3 Own Market Share and Rivals’ Shares 
As we noted in chapter 3.2, we examine if firms’ patenting profiles are sensitive 
to the market shares of the main foreign competitors – Other-Country:Main rivals. 






Table 3.8 Own Market Share and Main Rivals’ Market Shares 


















































































Firm Fixed-Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  No No No No 
Observations 378 252 378 252 
Notes: 
1. Estimated specification is (see chapter 3.2): 
8 		 ln	 ln	 ln	 : . 
The variables are as follows: 
 : Number of patents for firm i in year t. 
 : Firm-specific fixed-effect. 
 : Market share of firm i, lagged one period. 
 :  : Market share of other-country ‘main’ rivals of firm i, lagged one 
period. 
 : vector of control variables Enviro1, Enviro2, VER, Bankruptcy, and Merger. 
2. Estimation in column 1 and 2 are via the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses, and ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
3. The results of the specification tests for columns 1 and 2 are as follows. 
(a) Over-identification test  (p-value). Column 1: 331.16 (0.580). Column 2: 244.71 (0.271).  
(b) Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors are as follows. Column 1: 
Order=1: z=-2.42 (p=0.015). Column 2: Order=1: z= -2.05 (p=0.040).  
(c) Wald  (p-value): Column 1: 629.27 (0.000). Column 2: 424.18 (0.000). 
4. Estimation in column 3 and 4 are via the IV estimator. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses, and ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.	  and 
 are treated as endogenous, . , ln	 : , 




Table 3.9 Own Market Share and Main Rivals’ Market Shares 




















































Firm Fixed-Effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 378 252 378 252 
Notes: 
1. See table 3.8 for general comments. 
2. Compared to table 3.8, in the above table we replace Enviro1, Enviro2, VER and HHI by year time 
dummies. 
3. The results of the GMM specification tests for columns 1 and 2 are as follows. 
(a) Over-identification test  (p-value). Column 1: 303.88 (0.507). Column 2: 222.87 (0.105).  
(b) Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors are as follows. Column 1: 
Order=1: z=-2.43 (p=0.015). Column 2: Order=1: z= -2.07 (p=0.039).  
(c) Wald  (p-value): Column 1: 43.82 (0.000). Column 2: 31.77 (0.000). 
4. In columns 3 and 4, 	  and   are treated as endogenous. , 






Own market share effects 
 The estimated own market share elasticities are highly significant and similar to 
those presented in tables 3.3 and 3.4. The implied quantitative effects are presented in 
Table 3.10 (actual changes) and Table 3.11 (percentage changes). The implied 
elasticities are presented in Table 3.12 and 3.13. Overall, the inferences related to 
firms’ own market share remain the same even though we dropped HHI and included 
the main foreign rivals’ market share variable. 
Other-Country:Main rivals’ market shares 
 To note again, specification (8) is different from (5) in that we drop HHI and add 
the main rivals’ market share variables. In the panel, the correlation between firms’ 
own market shares and Other-Country:Main rivals’ shares is -0.32; this correlation is 
not high enough to cause collinearity problems. 
 In table 3.8, the other-country ‘main’ rivals, the panel estimates are positive 
ranging from about 0.8 to 0.18 and significant. However, as we move to table 3.9, 
while the point estimates are relatively similar, the estimates are not statistically 
significant for the full sample. Overall, the estimates indicate that as firms’ 
other-country primary rivals’ market shares increase (decrease), firms increase 
(decrease) patenting. Looking at the big picture scenario, it appears that the threat the 
firms perceive to their competitive positions from their (main) foreign rivals induces 




– that an increase in competitive threat from their (main) foreign rivals will lead to 
more patents – is similar in spirit to the hypothesis of competitive threat by Hu (2010). 
 
Table 3.10 Estimated Quantitative Effects - Actual Change: Main Rivals’ Market Shares 









   30 61 29 48 
  
:  
18 46 15 41 
Table 3.9. With Year Dummies 
   28 54 28 51 
  
:  
0 53 0 41 
Notes: 
1. Calculations are based on the GMM estimates from table 3.8 and 3.9. Only the main variables of 
interest are reported to save space. 
2. Estimated quantitative effects (as actual changes in variables) are based on considering a 
one-standard-deviation change in the relevant independent variable. If the underlying coefficient 
estimates were insignificant in table 8, we assign a value zero to that effect. The estimated 
quantitative effects are computed as follows. Given the elasticity (significant coefficients in table 3.8 
and 3.9), when independent variable x changes from ̅ to ̅ , the change in value of  







Table 3.11 Estimated Quantitative Effects – Percentage Change: Main Rivals’ Market Shares 









   18.11% 19.45% 17.33% 15.41% 
  
:  
7.40% 11.91% 6.25% 10.62% 
Table 3.9. With Year Dummies 
   16.99% 17.27% 16.76% 16.14% 
  
:  
0.00% 13.47% 0.00% 10.62% 
Notes: 
1. Calculations are based on the GMM estimates from table 3.8 and 3.9. Only the main variables of 
interest are reported to save space.  
2. Estimated quantitative effects are based on considering a one-standard-deviation change in the 
relevant independent variable. If the underlying coefficient estimates were insignificant in table 3.8 




Table 3.12 Estimated Elasticities: Own Market Share 









  Short-run 0.161*** 0.241** 0.154*** 0.191** 
  Long-run 0.671*** 1.111** 0.755*** 0.910** 
Table3.9. With Year Dummies 
  Short-run 0.151** 0.214** 0.149*** 0.200*** 
  Long-run 0.726** 1.049** 0.720*** 0.873*** 
Notes:  
1. Short-run elasticities are the estimated coefficients for  reported in table 3.8 and 3.9. 
(As the specification is estimated in log-linear form, the coefficients are interpreted as elasticities.) 
An asterisk * indicates that the estimate is significant (see table 3.8 and 3.9). 
2. Long-run elasticities are calculated as follows: , where  is the estimated coefficient of 








Table 3.13 Estimated Elasticities: Main Rivals’ Market Share 









  Short-run 0.097* 0.184* 0.082** 0.164*** 
  Long-run 0.404* 0.848* 0.402** 0.781*** 
Table 3.9. With Year Dummies 
  Short-run 0.081 0.208** 0.068 0.164** 
  Long-run 0.389 1.020** 0.329 0.716** 
Notes:  
1. Short-run elasticities are the estimated coefficients for 	 :  reported in 
table 3.8 and 3.9. (As the specification is estimated in log-linear form, the coefficients are interpreted 
as elasticities.) An asterisk * indicates that the estimate is significant (see table 3.8 and 3.9). 
2. Long-run elasticities are calculated as follows: , where  is the estimated coefficient of  
	 :  (specification 6.1) and is the estimated coefficient of the 




We use firm-level data to examine the relationship between competition and 
patenting in the U.S. automobile market. The combination of the U.S. market’s 
economic importance, market dynamics, and the significant intertemporal 
fluctuations in firms’ market shares and patents make this an interesting market to 
examine the link between competition and innovation. As we noted in chapter 2.1, a 
substantive theoretical literature has provided deep insights into this relationship. 
Perhaps the most recent and sophisticated models exploring this relationship are by 
Aghion et al. (2001) and Aghion et al. (2005). Overall, the theoretical literature is 
inconclusive in terms of the ‘sign’ of the relationship. The empirical literature, 
reflects this theoretical ambiguity, and has produced widely differing estimates. In 




aggregated U.K. 2-digit industry data, Hashmi (2013) using U.S. industry data finds 
results that are diametrically opposite to Aghion et al. (2005). 
 Based on dynamic panel data estimates, our main findings are as follows. 
First, we find that an increase in firms’ market shares leads to an increase in patenting, 
and the relationship is moderately non-linear. Second, we find that higher 
market-wide competition results in an increase in patenting, and the relationship is 
weakly non-linear. Our results on market-wide competition appear similar in spirit to 
those of Aghion et al. (2005), although our firm-level data and control variables are 
very different from their aggregated 2-digit industry). The typical study in this 
literature does not control for both these effects. In this sense our empirical 
specification has a more complete set of controls.  
 In other results, we find that GM’s bankruptcy, representing an extreme case 
of firm-specific decline in fortunes, results in a sharp drop in a patenting. The Daimler 
Chrysler merger, representing the combination of two very large and prominent firms, 










 This chapter examines the relationship between knowledge gap and patent 
rivalry. Technological positions of firms have been recognized as one of the 
important factors influencing innovation, and are usually measured by technology 
gaps between firms. However, neither the theoretical nor the empirical literature 
provides clear evidence on the sign of the relationship. Studying the relationship 
between innovation and knowledge gap is important for several reasons. First, since 
innovation generates growth of markets and efficiency, creating institutions and 
markets that foster innovation are vital to increasing welfare. Second, if the 
relationship is negative, a firm which has a knowledge/technology gap with the leader 
would cede ground, then regulatory and subsidy policies, for example, would need to 
be structured and enforced appropriately to close technology gap and facilitate 
innovation. 
In this chapter we examine the effects of innovation rivalry and market 
competition on patenting in the U.S. automobile market. We use accumulated patents 
to measure firms’ knowledge stock, and compare firms’ knowledge stocks to get their 




is from the technological frontier in terms of accumulated patents to capture patenting 
rivalry.   
4.2 Empirical Specification 
 The main specification is described in chapter 3.2.1.  In this chapter, our primary 
specification is a dynamic panel data model which examines the relationship between 
patenting rivalry and patenting activity. Returning to (3),  is modeled as a function 
of the firm’s own technology gap and a set of other control variables: 
4′ 		 , , , Ψ , 
where X is the vector of control variables discussed below. Using (4), (3) and (2), our 
panel data model is:  
5′ 		 ,  
																																						 , , . 
In (5’),  is the annual total number of patents for firm i,  is the 
firm-specific intercept, , 	is the second lag of knowledge gap from the frontier 
of the firm, ,  is the second lag of own market share of the firm, X is a vector of 
other controls (discussed below), and  is a firm-specific error term.  
 The rationale for using knowledge gap and market share two periods back is as 
follows. We assume that before a firm formulating its current patenting strategy, it 
needs time to be fully informed about competitors’ patenting strategies and their 




,  (discussed in chapter 4.3.2), and using the second lag avoid repetition and 
the potential problem of collinearity. With these reasons, we use knowledge gap and 
market share in lagged two periods. 
 We include both quadratic term of knowledge gap and market share in our 
estimated specification. This is motivated by several factors. First, including 
knowledge gap allows us to examine how the technological position of the firm itself 
affects patenting, and whether the influence is non-linear. Second, the underlying 
theory model by Aghion et al. find the relationship between market competition and 
patenting will be affected by technology gap, and including both market share and 
knowledge gap allows us to examine the effect of one, controlling for the other. Third, 
our data (detailed in section 4) show dramatic reallocation of market shares across 
firms over our sample period, and controlling for market shares provide additional 
insight into the dynamics in competition and innovation.  
 The vector X includes the following control variables described in chapter 3.2.1:  
(a) Daimler-Chrysler merger (Merger). 
(b) GM’s bankruptcy (Bankruptcy). 
(c) Year dummies. 
 The vector X may include the following control variables: 
(d) , : the extant empirical literature predicts a non-linear relationship 
between market share and current patenting. We include the quadratic term of 




(e) , ∗ , : Aghion et al. (2005) predicts the influences of market 
competition on innovation can be altered by technological distance of a firm is from 
the frontier. Controlling the interaction between market share and technology gap 
allows us to examine whether patenting rivalry will be moderated by market share of 
not.  
 Our controls for a firm-specific intercept  and lagged firm-specific patents 
 are described in section 3.2.1.  
4.3 Data Description 
4.3.1 Innovation Knowledge Stocks 
 In our econometric analysis, we use knowledge stock to control for a firm’s gap 
between the leader and the firm. Stocks of innovation knowledge are a complex 
phenomenon and difficult to measure. One way to measure knowledge stock would be 
to use cumulative R&D expenditures for each firm. Unfortunately, R&D data are not 
available on a consistent basis for the firms in our sample.7 Another way to measure 
knowledge stocks is to use firms’ patents data to create cumulative patent counts.  
 A basic measure of the raw, unadjusted, cumulative patents would be as follows. 
Starting from 1969, our first year of data, we create a “cumulative patents” series: 
, ∑ , , where ,  is the total number of patents of firm  in 
year	 , and ,  is the cumulative patents of firm  in year	 . The time series in ,  
represents a firm’s innovation knowledge stock path. If a firm’s annual number of 
patents ,  is high, then its ,  path will rise at a faster rate.   
                                                 
7 While R&D data are available for the more recent years, their historical data are not available because they were 




 The above ,  measure, however, does not account for two aspects that have 
been noted in the literature. First relates to the intertemporal obsolescence of the 
underlying technology behind a patent, which may arise in part due to the emergence 
of newer technologies. This implies we need to adjust ,  for the rate of 
depreciation of patents. Second relates to the potentially phased-in, or delayed, use of 
a patent which could arise due to issues related to, for example, commercialization. 
This implies that we need to adjust ,  for the rate of diffusion of patents. 
 To implement these adjustments to the raw ,  series, we use the method 
proposed by Popp (2003). The patent depreciation and diffusion “adjusted” 
cumulative series is given by: , ∑ 1 ∗ , , 
where is the patent depreciation rate, and is the patent diffusion rate. Following 
Popp, we use a depreciation rate of 10% and a diffusion rate of 25%. Aggregating all 
previous patents with these depreciation and diffusion rate adjustments, we get a 
firm-specific time series ,  which represents the time path of a firm’s 
knowledge stock. As we note later in our estimation and checks of robustness, our 
broad inferences are not sensitive to some variations around the 10% and 25% rates 
noted above. 
 Since the patent data prior to our sample period are not available, the patent stock 
data are truncated. To construct the patent stocks without a sharp increase in early 
years, we need to have an initial benchmark of the stocks.  Generally, the initial stock 
is measured by dividing the initial observation by the sum of the depreciated rate and 




2013). Given our adjustment formula, we modify this method and define initial 
benchmark of accumulated patent stocks as the initial sample value of patents divided 
by the sum of the depreciation rate, the diffusion rate, and the average growth in 
annual patenting in the first four years of the sample: 	 , . 
When we construct the accumulated patent stocks, we initialize the stock at the 
beginning of the sample period and include the benchmarks in patent stocks: 
, .  
 The summary statistics for the unadjusted and adjusted accumulated patents are 





Table 4.1 Summary Statistics: Raw, Unadjusted, Cumulative Patents (AP)  
Firm   (%)
GM 8631.9 4228.2 48.9
Ford 4561.8 3259.1 71.4
Chrysler  1347.5 1151.2 85.4
Toyota 4021.4 3267.0 81.2
Honda 4291.6 4507.6 105.0
Nissan 4336.7 3073.6 70.8
VW 556.4 320.7 57.6
BMW 327.3 336.6 102.8
Daimler 2252.1 1481.4 65.8
Notes:  
 ,  and  are the mean, standard deviation and coefficient of variation (percent) of the 




Table 4.2 Summary Statistics: Adjusted Cumulative Patents (AdjAP) 
Firm   (%)
GM 2280.4 516.0 22.6
Ford 1395.0 656.6 47.1
Chrysler  442.6 295.2 66.7
Toyota 1158.2 789.9 68.2
Honda 1385.1 1347.1 97.3
Nissan 1199.5 687.6 57.3
VW 142.8 60.6 42.5
BMW 105.2 99.0 94.2
Daimler 640.2 287.6 44.9
Notes: 
1. Accumulated patents are adjusted by depreciation rate, diffusion rate, and benchmark at year 0. 
2. ,  and  are the mean, standard deviation and coefficient of variation 
(percent) of the adjusted cumulative patents for each firm. 
 
 Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics for the adjusted accumulated patents 
data. GM has the highest average adjusted accumulated patent profile of 2,280 among 
the nine firms. The sample average number of patents for Ford, Toyota, Honda, and 




has the lowest patent stock profile of the three U.S. firms. Daimler, the most active 
German firm, has a sample mean of 640 accumulated patents, which is four or five 
times larger than VW or BMW. The sample averages conceal important underlying 
dynamics. The three Japanese firms have greater annual patents and have increasing 
accumulated patent profiles during latter half of the sample period, among which 
Honda has the most rapid growth rate in accumulated patent profile. In the last decade 
of the sample period, Honda has surpassed GM and became the leading company in 
accumulated patents. The German firms individually, or as country total, have 







1. Adjusted accumulative patents are calculated by: 
, 1 ∗ ,  
, =
,  
=0.10, and is the rate of depreciation; 
=0.25, and is the rate of diffusion; 
 is the average growth in annual patenting in the first four years of firm i 
2. The data for the US are the sum of adjusted accumulative patents for GM, Ford and Chrysler. 
Japan, for Toyota, Honda and Nissan. Germany, for Volkswagen, BMW and Daimler.  
Figure 4.1 Firms’ Adjusted Cumulative Patents – Grouped by Country 
 
 Figure 4.1 plots the firms’ USPTO accumulated patents – grouped as country 
totals. Overall, the U.S. total of accumulated patents shows relative stability. The two 
big deviations in the U.S. totals come around 1970-1974 (mainly due to sharp increase 
in GM’s patents, potentially related to the Clean Air Act) and 2008-2010 (entirely due 
to drop in GM’s patents during its bankruptcy period). In other time, the U.S. total 
shows a flat trend. In contrast, the Japanese accumulated patents show sharp 








































































































around 2000. This is almost entirely driven by spikes in patenting by Toyota and 
Honda. The German profile is one of relative low and stable patent accumulation. The 
increase in the German profile around 1999 to 2002 is entirely due to an increase in 
Daimler’s patents during that period (related to the merger with Chrysler)  
4.3.2 Knowledge Gap 
 Our discussion in chapter 2.2 appears to indicate that one of the determinants of 
patenting responses is relative technological positions. Following our discussion, to 
further empirically assess the patent rivalry, we introduce a measure of the 
technology gap between firms to indicate relative technological positions. Following 
the predictions by Doraszelski, Aghion et al, and among others, we use the 
proportional technological distance a firm is from the technological frontier in terms 
of accumulated patents to capture the technology gap by Aghion et al. : 
/  where  denotes the firm with the highest knowledge stock in 
the current year, which is defined as “the leader.” A low value of  indicates 
that this firm is close to the leader in accumulated patents, while a high value of 
 indicates that this firm is far away from the leader in accumulated patents.  
 During our sample period, GM was the leader for 34 years, and was replaced by 
Honda in 2003, which continued as the leader till the end of our sample period. 
Honda had an acceleration of its annual patents towards the end of our sample 
period, leading to a sharp increase in its accumulated patents. The other major firm, 




sample, which lead to marked increase in its accumulated patents. Though Toyota 
had lower accumulated stocks in the early years, with significant increases in annual 
patenting, it was #4 in accumulated patents from 2001 to 2009, right behind GM, 
Ford, and Honda. Toyota surpassed GM in 2010 and Ford in 2011, and has been #2 
since 2011.  
 
Table 4.3 Summary Statistics: Technology Gap Based on Adjusted Cumulative Patents (GAP) 
Firm   (%)
GM 0.06 0.14 222.72%
Ford 0.46 0.15 31.98%
Chrysler  0.83 0.09 10.26%
Toyota 0.59 0.23 39.21%
Honda 0.54 0.38 71.48%
Nissan 0.56 0.24 41.67%
VW 0.95 0.02 2.13%
BMW 0.96 0.03 2.78%
Daimler 0.75 0.07 9.55%
Notes: 
1. Technology gap is calculated by adjusted accumulated patents. 
2. ,  and  are the mean, standard deviation and coefficient of variation (percent) of 
technology gap 
 
The summary statistics for the technology gap based on adjusted accumulated 
patents are presented in Table 4.3. GM has the lowest average technology gap 
among the nine firms since it was the leader in the most of the time. The sample 
average number of technology gap for Ford, Toyota, Honda, and Nissan are 




technology gap of the three U.S. firms. Daimler, the most active German firm, has a 
sample mean of 0.75 in technology gap, which is still 1/3 higher than the Japanese 
firms. The sample averages conceal important underlying dynamics. The three 
Japanese firms have greater annual patents and have increasing accumulated patent 
profiles during latter half of the sample period, among which Honda has the most 
rapid growth rate in accumulated patent profile. In the last decade of the sample 
period, Honda has surpassed GM and became the leading company in accumulated 
patents. The dynamics in their annual patenting and patent stock lead to the high 
standard errors of the three Japanese firms The German firms individually, or as 
country total, have relatively stable and high technology gap in accumulated patent 







1. Knowledge gap is calculated from adjusted accumulative patents: 
/  
L denotes the firm with the highest knowledge stock in the current year 
 denotes the adjusted accumulative patents of firm i 
2. The figure plots average knowledge gap by country. The average for the US is the average of 
knowledge gap for GM, Ford and Chrysler. Japan, for Toyota, Honda and Nissan. Germany, for 
Volkswagen, BMW and Daimler.  
Figure 4.2 Firms’ Knowledge Gap – Average by Country 
 
Figure 4.2 plots the firms’ USPTO average knowledge gap – grouped as country. 
Overall, the U.S. total of accumulated patents shows relative stability. The big 
deviation in the U.S. average knowledge gap comes around 2003, when Honda 
replaced GM and became the leader with highest adjusted accumulative patents. In 
other time, before 2003, the U.S. average shows a flat decreasing tread, and after 2003, 
the U.S. average shows an increasing trend. In contrast, the Japanese average shows 
sharp decline towards the end of our sample period. The two deviations in the 








































































































Honda became the new leader), and has been lower than the U.S. average since 
around 1990. This is almost entirely driven by spikes in patenting by Toyota and 
Honda, which reduces the difference in adjusted accumulated patents between the 
leader and the Japanese group. The German average is relative high and stable. The 
decrease in the German average around 2003 is entirely due to an increase in 
Daimler’s patents during that period (related to the merger with Chrysler). 
Next, we construct another measure of knowledge gap. In the measure described 
above, following the literature, we use proportional difference between a leading firm 
and a specific firm to capture the relative technological positions. The value of ,  
is from 0 to 1, and is 0 for the leader, which indicates that, we are unable to 
empirically measure the behaviors of the leading firms since its indicator is always 0. 
However, a leading firm can have totally different innovation strategies comparing to 
other firms. In addition, in our sample, GM was the leader for most of the time with 0 
value of	 , . As, a result, we are unable to empirically test the relationship between 
innovation and patent rivalry for GM for a large time period. Given this consideration, 
we construct another measure of relative technological positions based on firms’ 
ranks in accumulated patents. We use the proportional technological distance a firm is 
from the industry median in terms of accumulated patents to capture the technology 
gap: , / , where  denotes the firm 
with the median knowledge stock in the current year, which in our sample is the firm 
ranking 5 in accumulated patents. Unlike , , ,  can range from 




behind the industry median in accumulated patents, 0 value of  ,  indicates 
that a firm is the industry median in accumulated patents, and a positive value of 
,  indicates that this firm is the industry median in accumulated patents. The 
industry median has been changing over time and is not consistently 0 for any of the 
firms. With this measurement, we are able to capture the influences of knowledge gap 
for all the firms. We use this variable as a robustness check. 
4.3.3 Market Shares 
We have presented the summary statistics in chapter 3.3.2. In our estimated 
specification (5’), we use individual firms’ market shares as a market indicator of 
competitiveness. We do not use the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) or other 
concentration ratio to indicate competitiveness. The rationale is that first, 
market-wide competitiveness indicators are common for all the firms. Year 
dummies are perhaps more encompassing and better capture all effects that are 
common across firms in a given year. This allows us to check for the robustness of 
our market share and other estimates. Second, the main variable used to calculate 
market competition in Aghion et al. (2005) is Lerner index, and is not concentration 
ratios and describes profitability of firms. By using market share as indicators of 
market competition, our study is similar in spirit to Aghion et al. (2005). 
4.4 Estimation Results 
 Results from estimating specification (5’) are in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, using 




one important aspect of our results to keep in mind is that, conclusions of patenting 
rivalry and market competition are not sensitive to the specific estimation method 








































































Firm Fixed-Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 369 369 369 369 
Notes: 
1. Estimated specification is (see chapter 4.2): 
5′ 	 , , , , ,
. 
The variables are:  
 ,  – Number of patents for firm i in year t; 
  – Firm-specific fixed-effect; 
 ,  – Technology gap calculated by accumulated patents, lagged two period; 
 , – Market share of firm i, lagged two period;   
  : vector 	of control variables, may include  and ∗ , includes 
Bankruptcy, merger, and year dummies.  
2. Estimations are via the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses, and ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The annual data for 
each firm covers the period 1969-2012. Three initial observations are dropped due to taking lags and 
the first-differencing procedure of the estimator.  
3. The results of the specification tests are as follows. 
(a) Over-identification test  (p-value). Column 1: 297.05 (0.601); Column 2: 296.92 (0.603); 
Column 3: 296.18 (0.615); Column 4: 296.85 (0.605).  
(b) Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors are as follows. Column 1: 
Order=1: z= -2.36 (p= 0.018), Order=2: z=1.45 (p=0.147); Column 2: Order=1: z=-2.36 (p=0.018), 
Order=2: z=1.46 (p=0.143); Column 3: Order=1: z=-2.36 (p=0.018), Order=2: z=1.47 (p=0.142). 
Column 4: Order=1: z= -2.36 (p=0.018), Order=2: z=1.47 (p= 0.142).  
(c) Wald  (p-value): Column 1: 34.83(0.000); Column 2: 26.82 (0.000); Column 3: 32.01 (0.000); 







































































Firm Fixed-Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 378 378 378 378 
Notes: 
1. See table 4.4 for general comments.  
2. Estimations are via the IV estimator. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and ***, 
** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The annual data for each firm covers the 
period 1969-2012. Two initial observations are dropped due to taking lags and using deeper lags of 
the estimator as IV. ,  is treated as endogenous, , , , , , , 
, , and  are used as IVs. 
 
Path-dependence of patenting 
 The coefficient of the lagged-dependent variable is positive and highly 
significant, indicating persistence in the path of firms’ patents. The estimated 
elasticities are approximately 0.8. The lagged-dependent variable elasticities indicate 
considerable path-dependence in firms’ patenting. This is not surprising as we expect 
firms’ R&D processes, and innovation and patenting strategy to show some 




Knowledge gap effects 
 One of the main variables from theory is firms’ technology positions, which are 
captured by knowledge gap. In table 4.4 and 4.5, the full-panel estimate of knowledge 
gap is approximately -0.8, and the estimate of quadratic knowledge gap is 
approximately 1, both statistically significant. Given the standard errors, the point 
estimates are not statistically different across the various specifications reported in 
tables 4.4 and 4.5. This implies that the relationship between innovation and 
knowledge gap is non-linear: for the typical firm in our sample, when knowledge gap 
is small, an increase in knowledge gap leads to lower patenting; when knowledge gap 
is high, an increase in knowledge gap leads to higher patenting. In terms of 
technological positions of firms, first, leading firm innovates more than firms trailing 
the leader, and maintains its leading position. Second, firms trailing the leader 
innovate less and fall behind the leader. Among the trailing firms, those that are 
further away have high knowledge gap, and innovate less. As a result, within the 
trailing group, firms maintain their relative positions. Third, followers innovate more 
to catch up. Following firms have high knowledge gap, and an increase in knowledge 
gap leads to higher patenting.   
 Overall, and based on our discussion in chapter 2.2 and table 4.4 and 4.5, we find 
a U relationship between knowledge gap and patenting. Our findings are similar in 




 Next, we present the quantitative effects. First, we calculate the dividing point in 
the effects of knowledge gap. From our estimators, for the typical firm in our sample, 
when knowledge gap is approximately smaller than 0.4, an increase in knowledge gap 
leads to lower patenting; When knowledge gap is approximately higher than 0.4, an 
increase in knowledge gap leads to higher patenting. Second, we use the average 
value of technology gap, approximately 0.63, to calculate the average effect of 
technology gap on patenting in our data. Since the average value is 0.63 and is higher 
than the dividing point, across the specifications estimated, our calculations show that 
with the sample mean value, knowledge gap has a positive effect on patenting. This 
implies that on average, an increase in technology gap increases patenting.  
 Earlier we noted the results in Aghion et al. (2005) predicting a negative 
relationship between technology gap and patenting, and our result is in contrast to 
their findings. However, their estimates provide evidence that the marginal effect of 
technology gap on patenting is positive (Table III, pp719). According to Aghion et al. 
(2005), technology gap affects patenting indirectly, and the marginal effect of 
technology gap is:  
	 	 . 2005 :		
	
 
 They have two sets of estimates: (1) 1.43, 1.30; (2) 3.82, 
3.84. Given the competition value is from 0 to 1, estimators in set (1) always 
provide positive effect. Given the mean and standard errors of competition (Table IV 




their estimators suggests a positive effect between technology gap and patenting, 
which is similar in spirit to our finding.   
Own market share effects 
 Our second key variable from theory is market competition, and our measure is 
market share. In table 4.4 and 4.5, the full-panel estimate of market share is 
approximately 1.8 and statistically significant. This implies that for the typical firm in 
our sample, an increase in market share leads to higher patenting. The estimate of 
quadratic market share is insignificant, implying we do not find evidence of the 
inverted-U relationship between market competition and innovation, and our finding 
is different to Aghion et al. (2005). 
Indirect market share effects 
 Our third key variable from theory is the indirect effect of knowledge gap via 
market share, and our measure is the interaction of market share and knowledge gap. 
In table 4.4 and 4.5, the full-panel estimate of the interaction is insignificant. This 
implies that knowledge gap does not indirectly affect patenting, and the relationship 
between market share and patenting is not affected by technology gap. This is in 
contrast to Aghion et al. (2005). 
 Next, we report several check of robustness. To save space, below we only report 
the main coefficients of interest (the estimated specifications include all the control 




C1: The exclusion of the German firms does not alter the main inferences. Though the 
knowledge gaps of German firms are relatively stable, their annual patenting profiles 
are slightly increasing. It is reasonable to doubt that the increasing part of the U 
relationship between technology gap and patenting is driven by German firms. We 
find the U relationship is robust after dropping the German firms, and the increasing 
part of the U relationship is not solely caused by the German firms. We re-estimate the 





















∗ 	 	 	 	  
We note that while there are marginal differences in the estimated quantitative 
effects, our key inferences remain intact, even after adding  and ∗
. 
C2: Re-estimate full specification by including lag-ONE of GAP and Shr. We use 
lag-TWO of GAP and Shr given the considerations of potential lag in taking strategic 
patenting actions and to avoid the repetition of   as a dependent variable as 




with lag-ONE of GAP and Shr. One important aspect of this estimation to keep in 
mind is that  is proved to be endogenous, and we add  into IVs when 





















∗ 	 	 	 	  
We note that while there are marginal differences in the estimated quantitative 
effects, our key inferences remain intact, even after adding  and ∗
. 
 Third, we replace ,  with 	 ,  in equation (5) and dropped the 
quadratic term of , . We also experimented with re-estimating equation (5) 
with citation-adjusted data. To conserve space we do not report the resulting estimates.  
While there are marginal differences in the estimated quantitative effects, our overall 
inferences are similar to these alternative measurements of market competition and 
innovation. 
Finally, we replace ,  with , . ,  can be negative, 0, 




the industry median. Unlike , , because of the changing industry median,  
,  is not consistently 0 for any firms in our sample, which allows us to 





















∗ 	 	 	 	  
 We note that the relationship between relationship between ,  and 
patenting is still U shaped: The estimate of ,  is approximately -0.02, and 
the estimate of quadratic ,  is approximately 0.001, both statistically 
significant. The minimum level of patenting occurs when  ,  is 
approximately 0.025, which is higher than the industry median 0. In terms of values of 
, , first, when ,  is negative, the firm is behind the industry 
median, a higher ,  means smaller knowledge gap compared to the industry 
median. In this case, an increase in ,  means less behind compared to the 
industry median, and an increase in ,  leads to lower patenting. Second, 
when ,  is positive but small, in our case, approximately smaller than 0.025, 




,  leads to lower patenting. Third, when ,  is positive and large, 
in our case, approximately higher than 0.025, the firm is ahead of the industry median, 
and is relatively leading in accumulated patents. In this case, an increase in 
,  means more ahead compared to the industry median, and an increase in 
,  leads to higher patenting. In terms of technological positions of firms, 
first, firms falling behind of the industry median innovate more to catch up, and the 
closer to the industry median, the lower patenting firms have. Second, the lowest 
patenting occurs when the firm is close to and slightly ahead of the industry median. 
Third, leading firm innovates more and maintains its leading position. The more 
ahead of the industry median, the higher patenting a firm has.  
Though the relationship between ,  and patenting is still U shaped, the 
inferences are slightly different from before: in the previous measurement of 
knowledge gap, a firm is always behind the leader, and the U relationship indicates 
the patenting strategies in response to the innovation level of the leader. In 
, , a firm can behind or ahead of the industry median, and the U relationship 
indicates the patenting strategies in response to the industry median. The conclusions 
from these two different U relationships are similar in terms of technological 
positions of firms: followers innovate more to catch up, and are likely to reduce 
patenting when they are able to reduce the difference in accumulated patents, while 





 Panel (a): Full sample              Panel (b): U.S. and Japan Only 
            
Figure 4.3 Knowledge gap and Estimated Patents 
 
In figure 4.3 we plot estimated relationship between firms’ knowledge gap and 
patents using estimator of GMM (a) with all the nine firms, and (b) without German 
firms. From figure 2 we see that the relationship between knowledge gap and patents 
is U shaped: in panel (a), estimated patents decreases with knowledge stock initially 
from 170 to 140, and the curvature is very mild; then estimated patents increases with 
knowledge stock from 140 to 210, and the curvature is very mild. In panel (b), 
estimated patents decreases with knowledge stock initially from 240 to 210, and the 
curvature is very mild; then estimated patents increases with knowledge stock from 
210 to 320, and the curvature is very mild. Comparing panel (a) and panel (b), we 
found U.S. and Japanese firms are more likely to innovate compared to German firms, 
which is consistent with patenting profiles of the nine firms. In both panels, 
comparing the estimated patents at GAP=0 and GAP=1, we find followers tend to 
innovate more than both the leader and trailing firms, indicating the catching up 
behaviors of the followers (Khanna, 1995; Lerner, 1997; Aghion et al., 2001; 










































 Based on the results in table 4.4 and 4.5, and the checks for robustness, our broad 
conclusions are as follows.  
1. Technology gap between the leader and a following firm has a U shaped 
relationship with patenting. Our estimates in table 4.4 and 4.5 reveal that the 
relationship is somewhat complex. Knowledge gap has negative effect when firms are 
relatively closer to the frontier, and has positive effect when firms are relatively 
further away. One way to interpret this result is that if a firm is in the leading (low gap) 
group, it has lower incentive to innovate/patent and has small possibility of falling 
behind. In the group that is farther away from the leader (high gap), it has higher 
incentive to innovate/patent in order to catch up. This implies that as the leading edge 
moves higher, firms that are in the trailing group, they relatively fall behind, and firms 
that are in the lagging group, they relatively catch up.  
 Comparing these high and low gap groups, some of the results appear to be in line 
with predictions (e.g., Khanna, 1995) that the leading firms (lower-gap group) would 
innovate less than the following firms (higher-gap group). While some of the results 
appear to be in contrast with predictions (e.g., Lerner, 1997) that firms trailing the 
leader would innovate more. Comparing these two groups with the leader, the results 
are in line with predictions (e.g., Khanna, 1995; Grossman and Shapiro, 1987; 
Doraszelski, 2003) that leading firm would innovate more, especially when the gap 
decreases to some extent. While the results appear to be in contrast to some of the 
predictions (e.g., Aghion et al., 2001) that generally neck-and-neck firms would 




2. An increase in the market share results in higher current patenting. We do not find 
evidence of the inverted-U relationship between market competition and patenting. 
This result appears to be in contrast to some of the predictions (Aghion et al., 2005) . 
3. Knowledge gap does not indirectly affect patenting via market shares, and the 
effect of market share is not moderated by knowledge gap. The interaction variable 
controls for the indirect effects of knowledge gap and market share on patenting, and 
appears to indicate that there is no indirect effect, which appears to in contrast to the 
findings in Aghion et al. (2005). Our estimates in table 4.4 and 4.5 reveal that the 
effects of both knowledge gap and market share are direct.  
4.5 Conclusions 
We use firm-level data to examine the effects of innovation rivalry and market 
competition on patenting in the U.S. automobile market. The combination of the U.S. 
market’s economic importance, market dynamics, and the significant intertemporal 
fluctuations in firms’ market shares and patents make this an interesting market to 
examine the link between competition and innovation. 
 Based on dynamic panel data estimates, our main findings are as follows. First, 
we find that the relationship between technology gap and patenting is non-linear and 
is U shaped, and an increase in knowledge gap first leads to a decrease and then an 
increase in patenting. Second, we find that higher market share results in an increase 
in patenting, and we do not find the non-linear inverted-U relationship. Third, we find 




technology gap, and technology gap does not affect patenting via market competition. 
Our results on market-wide competition appear to be different from Aghion et al. 
(2005). The typical study in the literature of the effects of knowledge gap does not 
control for both market competition and knowledge gap. In this sense our empirical 










 This chapter examines the shifting dynamics in compositions of patents in the 
U.S. automobile market. The U.S. market has seen dramatic intertemporal changes in 
patenting profiles of the main firms. As an industry relies heavily on mechanical, 
mechanical technologies have been the core innovation for years. However, in recent 
years, the proportion of mechanical technologies dropped sharply. In early 1970s, the 
percentage of mechanical technologies in the overall patenting in the auto industry 
was around 50% and increased to around 60% in 1980s. It reached a peak of 76% in 
1986, and began to decline after that. In 2010, the percentage of mechanical 
technologies declined to 36%. In contrast, technologies related to computers and 
communications had been around 3% in 1970s and early 1980s, and has been 
increasing since middle 1980s. In 2012, its percentage has reached to around 28%, 
which is just below mechanical technologies. Those changing percentages imply 
shifting dynamics in compositions of patents in the U.S. automobile market. By 
focusing on the auto industry, we are able to understand the evolution of patents by 
categories as well as inter-firm innovation rivalry. 
First, we use patents as an indicator of innovative activity. Second, we compile 




examine the changing composition (by category) of patents, and the potential roles 
played by, for example, inter-firm innovation rivalry, environmental regulations, and 
mergers and acquisitions, for these shifting dynamics. Aside from shedding light on 
the drivers of patent compositional shifts, the paper will also develop a set of stylized 
facts and patterns of patent composition in this industry. 
5.2 Empirical Specification 
 The main specification is described in section 3.2.1.  In this chapter, our 
objective is to empirically examine the role played by firm-specific knowledge gap on 
the intertemporal dynamics of firms’ patents. Our primary specification is a dynamic 
panel data model which examines the relationship between patenting rivalry and 
patenting activity. Returning to (3),  is modeled as a function of the firm’s own 
knowledge stock in related fields, own patent concentration, rivals’ average patent 
concentration, and a set of other control variables: 
4′′ 		 ,	 , 	 , Ψ , 
where X is the vector of control variables discussed below. Using (4’’), (3) and 
(2), our panel data model is:  
5′′ 		 , , ,	  
																																						 , 	 , . 
In (5’’), k=Total, C1, C2, C4, C5, and C6, and the details of patent classifications 




class k,  is the firm-specific intercept, ,	 	 is the second lag of adjusted 
knowledge stock of firm i in year t, ,  is the lag of own patent concentration of 
the firm, 	 ,  is the lag of rivals’ average patent concentration, X is a vector of 
other controls (discussed below), and  is a firm-specific error term. 
 The rationale for using knowledge stock two periods back is as follows. We 
assume that before a firm formulating its current patenting strategy, it needs time to be 
fully informed about competitors’ patenting strategies and their knowledge stocks. 
Second, ,  is included in the calculation of the variable ,	  (discussed in 
chapter 4.3), and using the second lag avoid repetition and the potential problem of 
collinearity. With these reasons, we use knowledge stock in lagged two periods. 
 We include knowledge stock, own patent concentration, and rivals’ average 
patent concentration in our estimated specification. This is motivated by several 
factors. First, the underlying theory model by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) find prior 
knowledge can capture both knowledge exploration and exploitation, and including 
knowledge stock allows us to examine how the previous knowledge of the firm itself 
affects patenting as a combined measurement. Second, the underlying theory models 
(e.g., Nelson, 1959; Dosi, 1982; March, 1991; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Leventhal and 
March, 1993; Granstrand, 1998) find keeping a diversified knowledge portfolio 
enhances firms to develop new knowledge effectively, and including concentration in 
patents allows us to examine the effect of knowledge diversification on current 
innovation. Third, our data (detailed in chapter 5.3) show dramatic reallocation of 




controlling for both own patent concentration and rivals’ average patent concentration 
provide additional insight into the dynamics in innovation and innovation rivalry.  
The vector X includes the following control variables described in chapter 3.2.1:  
(a) Daimler-Chrysler merger (Merger). 
(b) GM’s bankruptcy (Bankruptcy). 
(c) Year dummies. 
 Our controls for a firm-specific intercept  and lagged firm-specific patents 
 are described in chapter 3.2.1.  
5.3 Data Description  
5.3.1 Patent Categories 
 In our econometric analysis, we follow the classification by Hall et al. (2001) to 
classify the patents.  We use the main current U.S. class assigned by USPTO to each 
patent to group patents into 6 main categories and 37 subcategories. They are: (1) 
Chemical (6 sub-categories); (2) Computers & Communications (5 sub-categories); 
(3) Drugs & Medical (4 sub-categories); (4) Electrical & Electronic (7 sub-categories); 
(5) Mechanical  (6 sub-categories); (6) Others (9 sub-categories).  Instead of patent 
counts, we use annual patent shares in each category to show the distribution of 
patents and the shifting dynamics in technologies.  We calculate patent shares of 








, where ,  is total patents in in category k for firm i, ,  is total patents for 
firm i. 
We also perform firm-level and market-total time-series analysis to show the 
trend in patenting of a certain category: 
, ,  







Table 5.1 Summary Statistics: Category 1 Chemical 
Firm   (%) Time Trend 
GM 5.76 2.53 43.89% 
-0.073* 
(0.042) 
Ford 11.08 7.84 70.78% 
-0.225*** 
(0.065) 
Chrysler 3.30 3.61 109.58% 
-0.082* 
(0.041) 
Toyota 6.09 2.87 47.14% 
-0.051 
(0.033) 
Honda 3.95 3.41 86.39% 
-0.025 
(0.042) 
Nissan 5.36 3.97 74.15% 
-0.038 
(0.039) 
VW 2.71 3.64 134.22% 
-0.038 
(0.041) 
BMW 1.00 2.76 277.25% 
0.018 
(0.015) 
Daimler 3.57 2.59 72.70% 
0.058* 
(0.032) 





, , 1, 2, … , 6.	 ,  is total patents in in category k for firm i,  is 
total patents for firm i 
2. ,  and  are the mean, variance and coefficient of variation (percent) of the shares 
of patents in category k for firm i. 
3.  is the estimated time trend from equation  with 
robust standard errors in parentheses, and *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
 
The summary statistics of patent shares by firm by and market total in category 1 
(Chemical) are presented in table 5.1. The mean of patent share in this category ranges 
from 1 (BMW) to 11 (Ford), and the difference among firms is small. The average 
annual patent shares of U.S. group and the Japanese group are high and close, and the 
German group has the relatively low patents in this category. The low standard errors 




chemical patenting. As a traditional technology area, firms are relatively less active in 
this category. For the U.S. firms, time trend is negative and significant, indicating U.S. 
firms are relatively reducing their chemical patenting. For the Japanese firms, time 
trend is insignificant, indicating Japanese firms are relatively stable in chemical 
patenting. For VW and BMW, time trend is insignificant, indicating they are 
relatively stable in chemical patenting. For Daimler, time trend is significant and 
small, indicating that it is relatively increasing its chemical patenting slightly. For 
market total, the time trend is negative, indicating the overall market is relatively 







1. Patent share is calculated by	
,
, , 1, 2, … , 6.	 ,  is total annual patents in in category k for country i,  
is total annual patents for country i 
2. The data for the US are the sum of USPTO patents in Category 1 (Chemical) for GM, Ford and 
Chrysler. Japan, for Toyota, Honda and Nissan. Germany, for Volkswagen, BMW and Daimler.  
Figure 5.1 Firms’ Patent Shares (by country): C1 (Chemical) 
 
 Figure 5.1 plots the firms’ patents shares in category 1 (Chemical) – grouped as 
country totals. The percentage of Chemical patents was around 0.1 for all the firms 
around early stages, and has been much lower than 0.1 since around 1991, indicating 
that the firms in our sample make few and decreasing amount of innovations in the 
area of chemical technologies. Overall, the U.S. profile has relatively highest 
percentage in Chemical patents, while the Japanese and German profiles are close and 
relatively stable. From the figure, it is obvious that U.S. firms have declining patent 
shares in Chemical patents during the full sample period, while the Japanese and 









































































































in table 5.1. In addition, though U.S. profile was the highest in early stages, since 
around 1997, the three countries have close and stable market shares in category 1. 
 
Table 5.2  Summary Statistics: Category 2 Computers & Communications 
Firm   (%) Time Trend
































8.30 8.50 102.34% 
0.395*** 
(0.120) 





, , 1, 2, … , 6.	 ,  is total patents in in category k for firm i,  is 
total patents for firm i 
2. ,  and  are the mean, variance and coefficient of variation (percent) of the shares 
of patents in category k for firm i. 
3.  is the estimated time trend from equation  with 






The summary statistics of patent shares by firm by and market total in category 2 
(Computers & Communications) are presented in table 5.2. The mean of patent share 
in this category ranges from 8 to 13, and the difference among firms is small. The 
average annual patents of U.S., Japan, and German firms are close, implying the nine 
firms are close in patenting profiles in category 2. GM has the highest standard errors, 
indicating it has dynamics in patenting strategies in category 2. The standard errors of 
other firms are close. The time trend in category 2 is positive and significant for all the 







1. Patent share is calculated by	
,
, , 1, 2, … , 6.	 ,  is total annual patents in in category k for country i,  
is total annual patents for country i 
2. The data for the US are the sum of USPTO patents in Category 2 (Computers & Communications) 
for GM, Ford and Chrysler. Japan, for Toyota, Honda and Nissan. Germany, for Volkswagen, BMW 
and Daimler.  
Figure 5.2 Firms’ Patent Shares (by country): C2 (Computers & Communications) 
 
Figure 5.2 plots the firms’ patents shares in category 2 (Computers & 
Communications) – grouped as country totals. The percentage of Computers & 
Communications patents started at around 0 in 1969, increased to around 0.1 and 
surpassed chemical patents in early 1990s, and increased to over 0.2 for all the nine 
firms in 2000s, especially for the U.S. and Japanese firms whose country profiles 
were over 0.3 in 2010s. From the figure, all the firms in our sample are innovating 
more in Computers & Communications patents. Respond to the rapid development in 
computers & communications technologies in other industries, automobile firms in 









































































































treated as more traditional companies in innovation, given the strong development in 
mobile and computer technologies in recent years, automobile innovate more and 
more heavily in this area to keep pace with the overall environment. Overall, the 
Japanese profile has relatively highest percentage in Computers & Communications 
patents, while the U.S. and German profiles were close before around 2003, and U.S. 
firms have been developing fast since 2003 and are close to the Japanese firms in this 
area. From the figure, it is obvious that all three countries have increasing trend in 
Computers & Communications patents, which is consistent with the discussion in 
table 5.2.  
 Category 3 is about drugs and medical. Given the characteristics of the auto 
industry, patents are generally not related to category, and the patent counts in this 
category are almost consistently 0. In addition, drugs and medical technologies are 
not important for the auto industry and will not affect their market shares and products. 
Given these considerations, we do not report the summary statistics of category 3 and 






Table 5.3  Summary Statistics: Category 4 Electrical & Electronic 
Firm   (%) Time Trend 
































15.45 5.86 37.93% 
0.371*** 
(0.065) 





, , 1, 2, … , 6.	 ,  is total patents in in category k for firm i,  is 
total patents for firm i 
2. ,  and  are the mean, variance and coefficient of variation (percent) of the shares 
of patents in category k for firm i. 
3.  is the estimated time trend from equation  with 
robust standard errors in parentheses, and *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
 
The summary statistics of patent shares by firm by and market total in category 4 
(Electrical & Electronic) are presented in table 5.3. The mean of patent share in this 
category ranges from 11 (VW) to 22 (GM), and the difference among firms is small. 
The average annual patent shares of U.S. group and the Japanese group are high and 
close, and the German group has the relatively low patents in this category. The low 




dynamics in annual electrical & electronic patenting. From the sign of time trend, 
firms show heterogeneity in patenting behaviors in this area. For the U.S. firms, time 
trend is negative or significant, indicating U.S. firms are relatively reducing or 
maintaining their electrical & electronic patenting. For the Japanese and German 
firms, time trend is insignificant, indicating Japanese and German firms are relatively 
increasing their electrical & electronic patenting. For market total, the time trend is 
positive, indicating the overall market is relatively increasing electrical & electronic 







1. Patent share is calculated by	
,
, , 1, 2, … , 6.	 ,  is total annual patents in in category k for country i,  
is total annual patents for country i 
2. The data for the US are the sum of USPTO patents in Category 4 (Electrical & Electronic) for GM, 
Ford and Chrysler. Japan, for Toyota, Honda and Nissan. Germany, for Volkswagen, BMW and 
Daimler.  
Figure 5.3 Firms’ Patent Shares (by country): C4 (Electrical & Electronic) 
 
Figure 5.3 plots the firms’ patents shares in category 4 (Electrical & Electronic) – 
grouped as country totals. Overall, the U.S. profile has relatively highest and stable 
percentage in Electrical & Electronic patents, which is around 0.2, and has slightly 
declined since around 2003. The Japanese and German profiles are close and 
increasing, and they have surpassed U.S. firms in this area since middle 2000s. From 
the figure, it is obvious that U.S. has slightly declining trend while Japan and 
Germany have increasing trends in Electrical & Electronic patents, which is 









































































































technologies, the frontier in electrical & electronic technologies are keep moving 
forward, and firms must innovate to keep up with the frontier 
 
Table 5.4  Summary Statistics: Category 5 Mechanical 
Firm   (%) Time Trend 
































60.12 11.68 19.43% 
-0.911*** 
(0.116) 





, , 1, 2, … , 6.	 ,  is total patents in in category k for firm i,  is 
total patents for firm i 
2. ,  and  are the mean, variance and coefficient of variation (percent) of the shares 
of patents in category k for firm i. 
3.  is the estimated time trend from equation  with 
robust standard errors in parentheses, and *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
 
 The summary statistics of patent shares by firm by and market total in category 5 




industry, mechanical innovations have the highest percentage in all the 6 categories. 
The mean of patent share in this category ranges from 47 (GM) to 63 (Honda), and the 
difference among firms is relatively large. The U.S. group has the lowest patent share 
in mechanical technologies compared to the Japanese and German groups. The 
German group has the highest standard error in mechanical technologies compared to 
the U.S. and Japan group. As a traditional and core technology area for the auto 
industry, mechanical technologies are losing power and attraction for the auto 
industry. The time trend is negative of all the firms and market total, except Ford and 
Chrysler, indicating firms are relatively innovating less in mechanical technologies. 
Compared to category 2 (Computers & Communications) and 4 (Electrical & 
Electronic) which have advancing technological frontiers, mechanical technologies 
have relative small development, which can be one of the explanations that the time 
trend is negative: given the little advancement in mechanical technologies, firms are 







1. Patent share is calculated by	
,
, , 1, 2, … , 6.	 ,  is total annual patents in in category k for country i,  
is total annual patents for country i 
2. The data for the US are the sum of USPTO patents in Category 5 (Mechanical) for GM, Ford and 
Chrysler. Japan, for Toyota, Honda and Nissan. Germany, for Volkswagen, BMW and Daimler.  
Figure 5.4 Firms’ Patent Shares (by country): C5 (Mechanical) 
 
Figure 5.4 plots the firms’ patents shares in category 5 (Mechanical) – grouped 
as country totals. Overall, the U.S. profile has relatively lowest and stable percentage 
in Electrical & Electronic patents, which is around 0.5, and has slightly declined since 
around 2003. The Japanese and German profiles are close and high: their percentages 
in Mechanical patents were around 0.7 before 1990s, and declined to around 0.5 in 
middle 2000s, especially for the Japanese firms, which declined to around 0.3 in 2012. 
From the figure, it is obvious that U.S. has slightly stable profile while Japan and 
Germany have decreasing trends in Mechanical patents, which is consistent with the 









































































































technologies in the automobile industry. However, given the strong impact of new 
technologies such computer & communication, and electrical & electronic 
innovations in recent years, mechanical technologies are relatively shoved aside, yet 
mechanical technologies still have the highest percentage in all the 6 categories 
mainly because of the characteristics of the automobile industry.  
 
 
Table 5.5  Summary Statistics: Category 6 Others 
Firm   (%) Time Trend 
































12.73 4.99 39.17% 
-0.180 
(0.186) 





, , 1, 2, … , 6.	 ,  is total patents in in category k for firm i,  is 
total patents for firm i 
2. ,  and  are the mean, variance and coefficient of variation (percent) of the shares 
of patents in category k for firm i. 
3.  is the estimated time trend from equation  with 
robust standard errors in parentheses, and *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  




 The summary statistics of patent shares by firm by and market total in category 6 
(Other) are presented in table 5.5. All technologies that are not grouped in category 
1-5 are grouped in this category. The mean of patent share in this category ranges 
from 6 (Toyota) to 13 (Daimler), and the difference among firms is small. The low 




1. Patent share is calculated by	
,
, , 1, 2, … , 6.	 ,  is total annual patents in in category k for country i,  
is total annual patents for country i 
2. The data for the US are the sum of USPTO patents in Category 6 (Other) for GM, Ford and Chrysler. 
Japan, for Toyota, Honda and Nissan. Germany, for Volkswagen, BMW and Daimler.  
Figure 5.5 Firms’ Patent Shares (by country): C6 (Other) 
 
Figure 5.5 plots the firms’ patents shares in category 6 (Other) – grouped as 
country totals. Overall, the U.S. and Germany profiles are close and high around 0.2, 









































































































is obvious that all the three countries have decreasing trends in miscellaneous 
innovations, which is consistent with the discussion in table 5.5. Since all other 
miscellaneous technologies are grouped in this category, the declining trends indicate 
firms are more specified in other technologies (mainly in Category 2 and 4), 
especially for the Japanese firms.  
 Comparing the 6 categories, especially Chemical, Computers & Communications, 
Electrical & Electronic, and Mechanical, we found evidence of technological 
distribution. First, chemical is relatively the least important category, and firms are 
reducing their innovation shares. Second, being untraditional for the auto industry and 
plays a more important role in current society, computers and communications 
technology has drawn the attention of all the firms with increasing patent shares. 
Third, Electrical & Electronic technologies are of the second importance for the auto 
industry as indicated by sample mean, and firms are innovating more in this area. 
Fourth, Mechanical technologies are most important for the auto industry, as 
indicated by the highest average patent share. However, being traditional, mechanical 
technologies are losing power and firms innovate less in this area. The decline in 
mechanical technologies is mainly caused by the increase in computers & 
communications and electrical & electronic technologies.  
5.3.2 HHI in Patents 
 Our discussion in chapter 2.3 appears to indicate that one of the determinants of 




assess the shifting dynamics in technologies, we introduce a measure of the 
technology diversity. Following the literature (Hall, 2002), we use the Herfindahl 
index of concentration to capture the concentration of technologies, and the average 
value of HHI of rivals to capture inter-firm innovation rivalry.  








, where ,  is the annual patent counts in category k of firm i in year t, ,  
is total annual patent counts of firm i in year t. We use percentage values to calculate 
HHI, and HHI ranges from 0 to 10000. A higher HHI indicates a firm is more 
concentrated in a specific category, and an extreme value of 1 indicates a firm focuses 
on a selected category. If technologies are distributed equally across 6 categories, HHI 
will have a value of 1700. Given the consideration that category 3 is not important for 
the auto industry, if technologies are distributed equally across other 5 categories, 






Table 5.6  Summary Statistics: HHI 
Firm   (%) Time Trend 
































4365.75 1103.58 25.28% 
-74.208*** 
(11.678) 
Total 3711.26 449.11 12.10% 
-6.803** 
(2.963) 
1. ,  and  are the mean, variance and coefficient of variation (percent) of HHI for 
firm i. 
2. HHI is calculated within firm i: ∑ ,  
3.  is the estimated time trend from equation , ,   with robust 
standard errors in parentheses, and *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% lev 
  
The summary statistics for the HHI based on annual patent distribution are 
presented in Table 5.6. The mean of HHI ranges from 3445 (Ford) to 5200 (VW), and 
the difference among firms is large. Since the mean of HHI is much higher than the 
values of equal-distribution (1700 for 6 categories and 2400 for 5 categories), we 
expect unequal patent segmentation among the different technological areas, which is 
consistent with our discussion in section 5.3.1.The average HHI of the U.S. group is 




U.S. group has lowest standard errors, and German firms have highest standard errors. 
The means and standard errors imply U.S. firms have relatively the most diversified 
patent profiles, and the most stable segmentation, while the German firms have the 
most concentrated patent profiles, and a lot dynamics in segmentation. The time trend 
is insignificant for the U.S. group, negative for the Japanese and German group, 
indicating that though U.S. firms are relatively stable in patenting segmentation, 
Japanese and German firms are reducing concentration and becoming more 
diversified in technologies. The time trend of the overall market is negative, indicates 
the auto industry is becoming more diversified in patents, and is mainly driven by 







1. HHI is calculated within country i: ∑ ,  
Patent share is calculated by	
,
, , 1, 2, … , 6.	 ,  is total annual patents in in category k for country i,  
is total annual patents for country i 
2.The data for the US are the sum of USPTO patents for GM, Ford and Chrysler. Japan, for Toyota, 
Honda and Nissan. Germany, for Volkswagen, BMW and Daimler.  
Figure 5.6 Firms’ Patent HHI – Grouped by Country 
 
 
Figure 5.6 plots the firms’ patents HHI – grouped as country totals. Overall, the 
U.S. profile has relatively lowest and stable trend in patent concentration and is 
around 3000. The Japanese and German profiles are close and high: before around 
1999, the HHI of both countries was around 5000 with large fluctuations, and HHI of 
Germany was slightly higher than that of Japan. The HHI of Japan slowly declined 
after around 1987, while that of Germany slowly declined after around 1994. After 
around 1999, the HHI of Japan and Germany were close to that of U.S. From the 








































































































had high patenting concentration in the early and middle stages, and became as 
diversified as U.S. in the late stage. The evidence from the figure is consistent with the 
discussion in table 5.6. 
 We also include Jacquemin-Berry entropy measure of diversification to capture 
the knowledge diversity of patenting profiles. The formulation of the entropy measure 
is: 
, ∑ , 	 1/ , , 
where ,  is the proportion of patents in category k for firm i in year t. 
An increase in  indicates higher patenting diversity, and when a firm 
focuses on only one category, entropy is 0. According to Jacquemin and Berry (1979), 
entropy measure is more sensitive to diversity than HHI by providing larger values.  
In our data, the average of entropy is 1.09, which is higher than HHI. We also 





We will use Entropy for robustness checks. 
5.4 Estimation Results 
 Results from estimating specification (5’’) are in Table 5.7 and Table 5.8, using 
different estimation method GMM and IV, respectively. From the results in the tables, 




stock and patent concentration (own/rival) are not sensitive to the specific estimation 





Table 5.7 GMM 
     














































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  369 369 369 369 369 369 
Notes: 




,	 ,	 , 	 	 ,
, 
where i=firm, t=year, and k=patent category (Total, C1 Chemical, C2 Computers & Communications , 
C4 Electrical & Electronic, C5 Mechanical, and C6 Others). 
The variables are:  
 ,  – Number of patents for firm i in year t in class k; 
  – Firm-specific fixed-effect; 





 , – Concentration in annual patents for firm i in year t in class k, lagged one period;   
 	 , – Average concentration in annual patents of rivals for firm i in year t in class k, 
lagged one period. Calculated  as follows:   
 	 , ∑ ,, /8. 
  : vector 	of control variables, , includes Bankruptcy, merger, and year dummies.  
2. Estimations are via the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses, and ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The annual data for 
each firm covers the period 1969-2012. Three initial observations are dropped due to taking lags and 





Table 5.8 IV 
     














































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  378 378 378 378 378 378 
Notes: 
1. See Table 5.7 for general comments.  
2. Estimations are via the IV estimator. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and ***, 
** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The annual data for each firm covers the 
period 1969-2012. Two initial observations are dropped due to taking lags and using deeper lags of 
the estimator as IV. ,  is treated as endogenous, , , ,	 , , , 








Path-dependence of patenting 
 The coefficient of the lagged-dependent variable is positive and highly 
significant, indicating persistence in the path of firms’ patents. The coefficient value 
varies across categories, indicating different elasticities in path-dependence of 
patenting in different technology fields. The estimated elasticities are approximately 
0.9 for overall patenting, 0.8 for Category 5 (Mechanical) which is highest, 0.4 for 
Category 1 (Chemical) which is lowest, and 0.6-0.7 for Category 2 (Computers & 
Communications), Category 4 (Electrical & Electronic), and Category 6 (Other). The 
degrees of path-dependence across categories are consistent with the patent 
distribution in the overall patenting portfolio, and the overall dependence is mainly 
driven by the largest technology field - Category 5 (Mechanical). The 
lagged-dependent variable elasticities indicate considerable path-dependence in firms’ 
patenting. This is not surprising as we expect firms’ R&D processes, and innovation 
and patenting strategy to show some continuity at least in the short-to-medium term. 
Knowledge stock effects 
 One of the main variables from theory is firms’ prior knowledge, which is 
captured by knowledge stock in related fields. In table 5.7 and 5.8, the full-panel 
estimate of knowledge gap is negative for overall patenting and Category 5 
(Mechanical), positive for Category 1 (Chemical), Category 2 (Computers & 
Communications), Category 4 (Electrical & Electronic), and Category 6 (Other). 




various specifications reported in tables 5.7 and 5.8. This implies that the relationship 
between innovation and knowledge stock is negative for the main category, which 
leads to the overall negative effect in the overall patent portfolio, and positive for 
other categories. In the literature, knowledge stock captures both knowledge 
exploration and exploitation, and a balanced portfolio in these two dimensions can 
enhances current innovation, while an unbalance portfolio can reduce current 
innovation. Given the large patent share, first, firms may be hampered by their 
existing mechanical technologies because of the unbalance between knowledge 
exploration and exploitation; second, because of the large knowledge stock, firms 
may incur diseconomies of scale.    
Own patent concentration 
 Our second key variable from theory is knowledge diversity, and our measure is 
patent concentration. In table 5.7 and 5.8, the full-panel estimate of patent 
concentration is approximately -0.3 and statistically significant for the overall 
portfolio, -0.5 and statistically significant for Category 4 (Electrical & Electronic), 
-0.6 and statistically significant for Category 5 (Mechanical), and insignificant for 
Category 1 (Chemical), Category 2 (Computers & Communications), and Category 6 
(Other). This implies that for the typical firm in our sample, an increase in patent 
diversification leads to higher patenting in electrical & electronic and mechanical 
technologies. As these two groups are two largest categories in the auto industry, a 
decrease in patent concentration or an increase in patent diversification indicates more 




research activities in other fields, and drive the positive effect of knowledge 
diversification on current innovation for the overall portfolio. The positive 
relationship between current innovation and patent diversification is consistent with 
the literature that knowledge diversification can increase innovation by capturing 
technological opportunities. 
Rivals’ average patent concentration 
 Our third key variable inter-firm innovation rivalry and our measure is the 
average patent concentration of rivals. In table 5.7 and 5.8, the full-panel estimate of 
rivals’ average patent concentration is approximately -2.5 and statistically significant 
for the overall portfolio, -4.0 and statistically significant for Category 4 (Electrical & 
Electronic), -3.0 and statistically significant for Category 5 (Mechanical), -3.0 and 
statistically significant for Category 6 (Other), and insignificant for Category 1 
(Chemical) and Category 2 (Computers & Communications). This implies that for the 
typical firm in our sample, an increase in rivals’ patent diversification leads to higher 
patenting in electrical & electronic, mechanical, and other technologies. Comparing 
the coefficients and standard errors of own and rivals’ patent concentration, rivals 
patent concentration has significantly higher effects on a firms’ current innovation. 
Since own knowledge diversification indicates the possibility of capturing 
technological opportunities, rivals’ patent diversification indicates their potential in 
capturing those opportunities. Given the innovation competition and the limited 
technological opportunities, rivals’ patent diversification also implies their ability to 




rivals’ patent concentration, firms pay more attention to the innovation rivalry 
indicated by rivals’ knowledge diversity. 
 Next, we report several check of robustness. To save space, in the tables we only 
report the main coefficients of interest (the estimated specifications include all the 





Table 5.9 GMM (No Germany) 
     




















































Table 5.10 IV (No Germany) 
     
















































Note: Variables and methods same as table 5.8, but the three German firms are excluded from 
sample. 
 
 First, the exclusion of the German firms does not alter the main inferences. We 
re-estimate the full specification with the U.S. and Japanese firms only and the results 
are reported in table 5.9 and 5.10. We note that while there are the estimated 






Table 5.11 GMM (sub-HHI) 
     

















































1. The variables are: 
 , – Concentration in annual patents in 37 sub-categories, lagged one period. 




, m=patent sub-category (Sub C1-Sub C37); 
 , – Average concentration in annual patents in 37 sub-categories of rivals, lagged one 
period.  Calculated as follows:   
 	 , ∑ ,, /8. 
2. Other variables and methods same as table 5.7 
 
 
Table 5.12 IV (sub-HHI) 
   

















































1. See table 5.11. 
2. ,  is treated as endogenous, , , ,	 , , , 






Second, using patent concentration in 6 main sub-categories in equation (5) with 
patent concentration in 37 sub-categories does not alter the main inferences. We 
re-estimate the full specification with ,  and 	 , , and the results 
are reported in table 5.11 and 5.12. We note though the coefficients are changed 






Table 5.13 GMM (entropy) 
     














































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 369 369 369 369 369 369 
Notes:  
1. The variables are: 
  , –Jacquemin-Berry entropy measure of diversification, lagged one period.  
 Calculated as  follows: 
 , ∑ , 	 1/ , , ,
,
,
, 1, 2, … , 6. 
  	 , – Average concentration in annual patents of rivals, lagged one period.  
 Calculated as follows:   
 , ∑ ,, /8 






Table 5.14 IV (entropy) 
   














































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 378 378 378 378 378 378 
Notes:  
1. See table 5.13 
2. ,  is treated as endogenous, , , ,	 , , , , , 
and  are used as IVs.Other variables and methods same as table 5.8 
 
 
Third, using patent entropy in equation (5) does not alter the main inferences. We 
re-estimate the full specification by replacing ,  and 	 ,  with 
,  and , . We do not use logarithm values of Entropy because 
the calculation of entropy already includes logarithm. The results are reported in table 
5.13 and 5.14. We note that since an increase in entropy means an increase in 
patenting diversity, our key inferences remain intact. 
 Finally, we use lag one of knowledge stock to re-estimate equation (5’’). We 




of rivals in related fields. To conserve space we do not report the resulting estimates. 
While there are marginal differences in the estimated quantitative effects, our overall 
inferences are similar to these alternative measurements of knowledge exploration 
and exploitation. 
Based on the results in table 5.7 and 5.8, and the checks for robustness, our broad 
conclusions are as follows.  
1. Knowledge stock has positive or negative effects. Our estimates in table 5.7 
and 5.8 reveal that the relationship between knowledge stock and current innovation 
is somewhat complex and depends on patent categories. Knowledge stock has 
negative effect on mechanical technologies, and has positive effect on chemical, 
computers & communications, electrical & electronic, and other technologies. One 
way to interpret this result is that if since mechanical technologies have the largest 
patent share in the overall portfolio, they also have the largest knowledge stock, and 
hence have potential diseconomies of scale. As a result, an increase in knowledge 
stock in mechanical technologies has decreasing returns, while an increase in 
knowledge stock in other categories brings increasing returns. In addition, given the 
rapid development in mobile and computer technologies, traditional technologies like 
mechanical are developing relatively slow, which potentially leads to the opposite 
effects of knowledge stocks. Our findings are consistent with the literature that firms 
are likely to be hampered by their previous knowledge in this field and innovate too 
narrow. Since knowledge stock captures knowledge exploration and exploitation, our 




can benefit current innovation (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), but will not always 
benefit current innovation (e.g., Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990; Klemperer, 1990; March, 
1991; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Levinthal and March, 1993; Granstrand, 1998).   
2. An increase in the knowledge diversification can have positive or insignificant 
effects. Our estimates in table 5.7 and 5.8 reveal that the relationship between 
knowledge diversification and current innovation is somewhat complex and depends 
on patent categories. When diversification in technology increases, firms will 
innovate more in electrical & electronic and mechanical technologies, while 
innovations in other categories are not affected. As the two main innovation 
categories in the auto industry, electrical & electronic and mechanical technologies 
benefit most from potential technological opportunities indicated by own knowledge 
diversification, while other technologies with small percentages in total patenting do 
not significantly benefit from firms’ own knowledge diversification. This is in line 
with some of the predictions that having a diversified knowledge portfolio can 
increase innovation (e.g., Nelson, 1959; Dosi, 1982; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; 
March, 1991; Leventhal and March, 1993). 
3. An increase in rivals’ knowledge diversification can have positive or 
insignificant effects. Our estimates in table 5.7 and 5.8 reveal that the relationship 
between rivals’ knowledge diversification and current innovation is somewhat 
complex and depends on patent categories. In our study, knowledge diversification is 
an indicator of own potential technological opportunities, and rivals’ average 




technological opportunities are directly related to future innovation, rivals’ 
technological opportunities reveal their potential future innovation outcomes. As a 
result, by measuring rivals’ knowledge diversification, firms are able to measure 
rivals’ general innovation competitiveness. Given the characteristics of the auto 
industry, electrical & electronic and mechanical technologies are the two main 
innovation categories and represent firms’ core competitiveness in innovation. By 
innovating more in these two categories, firms are able to maintain their technological 
positions and compete with the potential expansion in innovation of rivals. Hence, 
when rivals’ diversification in technology increases, firms will innovate more in 
electrical & electronic and mechanical technologies as to compete in core 
technologies, while innovations in other categories are not affected since they have 
low patenting percentage and are relatively not that important for the auto industry. 
The quantitative effects of rivals’ knowledge diversification is higher than that of own 
knowledge diversification, indicating inter-firm innovation rivalry is a more 
important driver of innovation activities than own knowledge diversity. 
 The estimation of key variable helps to understand the shifting dynamics in 
patent segmentation. First, we find knowledge stock has mixed effects and can 
increase or decrease innovation. Second, we find knowledge diversification increases 
patenting especially for core technologies, which are electrical & electronic and 
mechanical in the auto industry. Third, we find rivals knowledge diversification 
increases patenting especially for core technologies, which are electrical & electronic 




diversification captures inter-firm patent rivalry and is the main driver of changing 
composition in patenting. Comparing the quantitative effects of own and rivals’ patent 
concentration and rivals’ patent, we find that, the effects of own patent concentration 
only has marginal difference on Category 4 and 5, implying a common effect on 
technologies in these two fields. While the rivals’ patent concentration has 
statistically higher effects on Category 4 than Category 5, implying a higher growth 
rate in electrical & electronic patents than mechanical patents. In terms of patent share, 
electrical & electronic technologies in Category 4 have increasing patent share, and 
mechanical technologies in Category 5 have declining patent share. This is consistent 
with the time trend described in section 3. 
5.5 Conclusions 
We use firm-level data to examine the evolution of patents by categories and 
inter-firm innovation rivalry in the U.S. automobile market. The combination of the 
U.S. market’s economic importance, market dynamics, and the significant 
intertemporal fluctuations in firms’ patents make this an interesting market to 
examine the link between competition and innovation. 
 Based on dynamic panel data estimates, our main findings are as follows. First, 
we find knowledge stock has negative effect on mechanical technologies, and has 
positive effect on chemical, computers & communications, electrical & electronic, 
and other technologies. Second, we find that knowledge diversification has positive 




rivals’ knowledge diversification has positive effects on electrical & electronic, 
mechanical, and other technologies, and the effects are statistically higher than those 
of own knowledge diversification. Finally, we find that rivals’ knowledge 
diversification has statistically higher effects on current patenting than own 
knowledge diversification, and is the main driver of changing compositions in 
patenting. The typical study in the literature of the effects of knowledge exploration 
and exploitation does not control for inter-firm innovation rivalry. In this sense our 









In this research, we examine numerical models for analyzing the 
determinants of patenting behaviors in an oligopolistic market. These models 
consist of market shares, market competition, knowledge stock, knowledge gap, 
and composition of patents. Previous research found that the relationships are 
complex and depend on specific structure of the model and parameters. We use 
firm-level time-series data over a long horizon (1969-2012) for nine well 
established firms selling in the U.S. market (GM, Ford, Chrysler, Toyota, 
Honda, Nissan, Volkswagen, BMW, and Daimler).We examined three aspects 
related to market competition, innovation, and innovation rivalry in the U.S. 
automobile industry. Furthermore, we include the two or more factors listed 
above in one specific model. For example, the typical study in the literature of 
the effects of knowledge gap does not control for both market shares and 
knowledge gap, and our empirical specification has a more complete set of 
controls. 
First, we examine the relationship between competition and innovation. We 
use two indicators of competition: HHI and main rivals’ market shares. Some of 
our key findings are: (1) increase in firms’ market shares result in higher 
patenting, and the relationship is reasonably non-linear; (2) higher market-wide 




non-linear; (3) there is relatively strong path-dependence in firms’ patenting 
behavior. We also compare our findings to those of Aghion et al. (2005) and 
Hashmi (2013). 
Second, we examine the relationship between knowledge gap and patent 
rivalry. We consider the competition in both market shares and knowledge 
positions, and included both factors in our model. We also include the 
interaction between these two factors and examined the indirect effects of 
knowledge gap and market share. Our key findings are: (1) the relationship 
between patenting and knowledge gap is non-linear, and is U shaped; (2) an 
increase in market share results in higher current patenting; (3) the interaction 
between firms’ market share and technology gap does not have a statistically 
significant effect on their current patenting. 
Third, we examine the changing composition of patents. We use the 
detailed information of patents and group them into 6 main categories and 36 
sub-categories based on their technology fields. In particular, we examine how a 
firm’s current patenting behavior is influenced by the own patent concentration 
and rivals patent concentration. Our key findings are: (1) the relationship 
between knowledge stock and current innovation is complex, and depends on 
technologies categories: knowledge stock has negative effect on mechanical 
technologies, and has positive effect on chemical, computers & communications, 
electrical & electronic, and other technologies; (2) an increase in own patent 




mechanical technologies; (3) an increase in rivals’ patent diversification results 
in higher current patenting in electrical & electronic on mechanical technologies; 
(4) rivals’ knowledge diversification has statistically higher effects on current 
patenting than own knowledge diversification, and is the main driver of 
changing compositions in patenting. We also develop a set of stylized facts and 





Appendix A: Literature Review Table 
 
 Table A.1  Selected Theoretical Papers: Relationship between Competition and Innovation 
Paper Innovation Variable(s) Competition Variable(s) 
and (or) Market 
Structure 
Results(s) 












Arrow (1962) General Innovation  Monopoly. Perfect 
competition. 
Positive 





Delbono and Denicolo 
(1991) 
R&D  Number of rivals 
Cournot oligopoly 
Negative 




Lee and Wilde (1980) R&D  Number of rivals Positive 
Loury (1979) R&D  Number of rivals Negative 
Mosel (2011) Patents. R&D Cost reduction and 
profits 
Bertrand 
Patent big innovations 









Table A.2  Selected Empirical Papers: Relationship between Competition and Innovation 
Panel A: Firm Specific Shares and Related Variables 
 
Paper Innovation Variables(s) Market Performance 
Variable(s) 
Results(s) 
Blundell et al. (1995) Commercialized 
innovations 
Market share Positive 
Blundell et al. (1999) Commercialized 
innovations 
Patents  
Market share Positive 
Brouwer & 
Kleinknecht (1999) 
Patents Sales Positive 
Hu (2010) Patents Imports Insignificant 
Hashmi & Biesebroeck 
(2006) 




Lee et al. (2011) Patents  Market share Positive 
Noel & Schankerman 
(2013) 
R&D Sales Effect varies across 
periods 
Scherer (1965) Patents Sales Positive, non-linear 
 
Panel B: Market-Wide Competition and Related Variables 
 
Paper Innovation Variables(s) Competition 
Variable(s) 
Results(s) 
Acs & Audretsch 
(1988) 
Patents Concentration ratio Negative 




Blundell et al. (1995) Commercialized 
innovations 
Concentration ratio Negative 
Blundell et al. (1999) Commercialized 
innovations 
Patents 
Concentration ratio Negative 
Blind et al. (2006) Patents Competition intensity Positive 
Hu (2010) Patents Competing imports Positive 
Hashmi (2013) Patents Price cost margins Negative 
Levin & Reiss (1984) R&D HHI Insignificant 
Levin et al. (1985) R&D; Innovation Concentration ratio Insignificant 






Table A.3  Selected Empirical Papers: Relationship between Competition and Innovation (after 
Aghion et al., 2005) 
Paper Innovation Variables(s) Competition 
Variable(s) 
Results(s) 




Aghion et al. (2005) TFP liberalized entry General test: 
Positive 







Aghion et al. (2009) Patents Average profitability General test 
Non-linear, inverted-U 
shaped 
Aghion et al. (2012) TFP; Product 
innovation measured by 
share of value generated 
by new products 
Lerner index; 
interaction between 

















Dummies based on 
number of competitors: 




Amiti and Khandelwal 
(2013) 
Quality upgrade Import competition. General test: 
Products close to the 
quality frontier: 
positive; 
Products distant from 







Table A.3 (continued) 
Ayyagari et al. (2011) Dummies of innovation 
activities; Aggregate 
innovation index 
Number of competitors 









Berubé et al. (2012) R&D Profit-elasticity; 






Price cost margins: 
positive 
Blind  et al. (2006) Dummy of patenting 
motivations 
Competition intensity General test: 
Positive 






Correa  (2012) Patents Price cost margins Test of the inverted-U 
(Aghion et al., 2005): 
Relationship varies 
across periods 
Dabla-Norris et al. 
(2012) 






Fu (2008) Patents; Innovation 
Efficiency 
FDI General test: 
Positive 
Fu and Gong (2009) Technical change and 
efficiency improvement, 
both decomposed from 
TFP 
HHI General test: 





Gorodnichenko et al. 
(2010) 
Dummies of new 
product, new 








Hashmi (2013) Patents Price cost margins Test of the inverted-U 
(Aghion et al., 2005): 
Negative 






Table A.3 (continued) 
Lederman (2009) Probability of New 
Product 
business density: 
number of firms per 
capita 
General test:  
Insignificant 
Lederman (2010) Probability of 
innovation 
Index of ease of entry; 
business density: 




Lee et al. (2011) Production technology HHI General test: 
Positive 
Li et al. (2013) Technological progress 
measured by TFP 
FDI stock General test: 
Positive, non-linearity 
from interactions with 
R&D stock or capital 
stock: negative 
interactions. 
Liu et al. (2014) “Make” innovation: 
ratio of expenditure on 
innovation to the total 
number of firms;  
“Buy” innovation: ratio 
of expenditure on 
buying innovation to the 
total number of firms  
intensity of 
competition: the share 
of output; Industry 
concentration: ratio of 
total output value to 








Peneder and Woerter 
(2014) 
Ordinal variables 
related to R&D 
Ordinal variables 
related to number of 
competitors  
Test of the inverted-U 
(Aghion et al., 2005): 
Non-linear, inverted-U 
shaped 
Peroni & Gomes 
Ferreira (2012) 
R&D Profit elasticity; 
Industry price cost 
margin 
General test: 
Non-linear, U shaped 
Polder  and 
Veldhuizen  (2012) 
R&D Profit-elasticity; 
Industry and firm price 
cost margins 
Test of the inverted-U 




Industry price cost 
margins: Insignificant;
Firm price cost 
margins: positive 







Table A.3 (continued) 
Schmeiele (2012) Dummies of innovation 
activities abroad: R&D, 
new products, and new 
processes 
Competition variables 
in home country: price 
competition; 
competitive situation; 
competition of new 




Sjöholm and Lundin 
(2013) 










4 different competition 
perception indicators: 
(1) Easy substitution of
products; 
(2) Constant arrival of 
competing products; 
(3) Quick obsolescence 
of products; 




(1) Easy substitution of
products: negative; 
(2) Constant arrival of 
competing products: 
positive; 
(3) Quick obsolescence 
of products: positive 
for R&D or product 
innovation; negative 
for acquisition of 
technology or process 
innovation 
(4) Rapid change of 
production 
technologies: positive 
Teshima (2008) R&D; R&D intensity  Import competition General test: 
Positive 
Tingvall and Karpaty 
(2010) 
R&D HHI Test of the inverted-U 
(Aghion et al., 2005): 
Non-linear, inverted-U 
shaped 
Tingvall & Poldah 
(2006) 
R&D Industry and firm price 
cost margin; HHI 
Test of the inverted-U 
(Aghion et al., 2005): 
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